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JUBILEE UNDER TEXTUALISM
John Patrick Hunt*

INTRODUCTION
The idea of federal student loan “jubilee”—widespread loan forgiveness carried
out by the executive without additional action by Congress—continues what one
scholar has called its “march from the margin of policy debates to the center.”1 In
2019, presidential candidates Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren called for the
cancellation of student loans, but they did not explicitly say that the executive branch
should do the forgiving. Sanders’s and Warren’s plans either called for action by
Congress or were silent.2
In 2020, two legal analyses defending the lawfulness of jubilee appeared.3
Warren linked to one of them on her campaign website4 and pledged to “use existing
laws on day one of my presidency to implement my student loan debt cancellation
plan.”5 Since then, calls for executive forgiveness have grown ever louder. A
congressional resolution calling on President Biden to use executive authority
garnered sixty cosponsors, including Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer.6

*Professor of Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Research Scholar, University of California, Davis School of
Law (King Hall), jphunt@ucdavis.edu. Thanks to King Hall Dean, Kevin Johnson, and Senior Associate Dean
for Academic Affairs, Afra Afsharipour, for financial support. Thanks also to Katherine Florey for helpful
comments and insights. For research assistance, thanks to Hyo Jeong Jeon, Mike Ziencina, and to the Mabie
Law Library staff.
1. Luke Herrine, The Law and Political Economy of a Student Debt Jubilee, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 281, 281
(2020).
2. See John Patrick Hunt, Tempering Bankruptcy Nondischargeability to Promote the Purposes of Student
Loans, 72 SMU L. REV. 725, 768–69 & n.96 (2019) (discussing candidates’ positions).
3. See Herrine, supra note 1; see also Letter from Eileen Connor. Legal Dir., Legal Servs. Ctr. Harv. L.
Sch.
et
al.,
to
Sen.
Elizabeth
Warren
(Sept.
14,
2020),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Ltr%20to%20Warren%20re%20admin%20debt%20cancellati
on.pdf [hereinafter CLM Letter]. These analyses apparently built on 2016 work by Robyn Smith and Deanne
Loonin at the National Consumer Law Center and work conducted in 2017 by Luke Herrine, a Ph.D. student at
Yale Law School. See Andrew Marantz, What Biden Can’t Do on Student Debt, NEW YORKER (Oct. 29, 2021),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-biden-cant-do-on-student-debt-and-what-he-wont-do.
4. The version posted to the website is dated January 13, 2020. See Letter from Eileen Connor, Legal
Dir., Legal Servs. Ctr. of Harv. L. Sch. et al., to Sen. Elizabeth Warren (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://assets.ctfassets.net/4ubxbgy9463z/2uD5wivUoQ0z2do0dtxMP4/26e1c137389de86cbce575e68c6f908b
/Ltr_to_Warren_re_admin_debt_cancellation.pdf.
5. My Plan to Cancel Student Loan Debt on Day One of My Presidency, WARREN DEMOCRATS,
https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/student-loan-debt-day-one (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
6. Adam S. Minsky, Here’s Everyone Who Wants Biden to Cancel Student Loan Debt (It’s a Big List),
FORBES (Feb. 23, 2021, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamminsky/2021/02/23/heres-everyonewho-wants-biden-to-cancel-student-loan-debt-its-popular/?sh=45cb764241c0.f
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Seventeen state attorneys general wrote to Congress in favor of jubilee.7 There is
also a robust movement in civil society for executive forgiveness: 325 public interest
organizations joined one pro-jubilee letter,8 and over 1,000 academics joined
another.9
For his part, as a presidential candidate, President Biden supported cancelling
$10,000 of student debt per borrower through federal legislation.10 As presidentelect, he expressed doubts about his authority to forgive federal student loans
unilaterally;11 advocates replied by drafting an executive order directing a jubilee for
his signature.12 In April 2021, President Biden directed the Departments of
Education and Justice to collaborate on an analysis of executive authority to forgive
student loans.13 As of late December 2021, that analysis is not available. The
Department did release e-mails and versions of a memorandum on the subject in
August 2021 in response to a Freedom of Information Act request,14 but all
substantive analysis of widespread loan forgiveness was redacted.15 Although some
have speculated that the official review will conclude that the executive does not have
the power to forgive student loans without congressional action,16 the released emails may suggest otherwise.17
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Emily Stewart, The Debate Over Joe Biden Canceling Student Debt, Explained, VOX (Dec. 28,
2020, 9:11 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22152601/biden-student-loan-debt-cancellation.
11. See Karen Tumulty, Opinion, Trump Is Trashing the Government on His Way Out. Biden Is Confident
He Can Fix It., WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2020, 6:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-istrashing-the-government-on-his-way-out-biden-is-confident-he-can-fix-it/2020/12/23/c69fc9c2-4553-11ebb0e4-0f182923a025_story.html (quoting then President-elect Biden: “[I]t’s arguable that the president may
have the executive power to forgive up to $50,000 in student debt . . . . Well, I think that’s pretty questionable.
I’m unsure of that. I’d be unlikely to do that”).
12. See Executive Order: Continued Student Loan Payment Relief During the COVID-19 Pandemic, DEBT
COLLECTIVE, https://debtcollective.org/debtcollective-flickofapen.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2021).
13. See Lauren Egan, Biden to Review Executive Authority to Cancel Student Debt, NBC NEWS (Apr. 1,
2021, 4:08 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-review-executive-authority-cancelstudent-debt-n1262791.
14. See Marantz, supra note 3.
15. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Debt Cancellation Analysis Documents, Apr. 1–8, 2021,
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21096471/21-02311-f.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Debt
Cancellation Analysis Documents]; see also Aarthi Swaminathan, Student Loan Forgiveness: Heavily
Redacted Biden Administration Memo Becomes Public, YAHOO! NEWS, Nov. 2, 2021 (linking to cited
documents from sentence, “A long-awaited memo related to student loan debt cancellation is now public in
heavily redacted form.”). A brief unredacted part of one draft asserts that the Department has used its authority
under the HEROES Act to effectuate certain “waivers and modifications” without legal challenge, including in
2020, but does not address cancellation or forgiveness. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Debt Cancellation Analysis
Documents, supra, at 48.
16. See Zack Friedman, Will Your Student Loans Get Cancelled? Legally, No., FORBES (May 15, 2021;
12:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2021/05/15/will-your-student-loans-get-cancelledlegally-speaking-no/?sh=3a1f39b76255 (Stating that “[b]ased on current law,” the review requested by Biden
“could be another setback for student loan cancellation.”).
17. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Debt Cancellation Analysis Documents, supra note 15, at 42 (memorandum
co-author suggesting “we may want to directly engage with the Rubinstein memo” and “[o]ur Rubinstein
countering in the original was [redacted].” The referenced “Rubinstein memo” may well be the January 2021
memorandum from the Department’s Office of the General Counsel to Secretary DeVos, authored by Reed
Rubinstein, that concluded that executive forgiveness was unlawful. For further discussion, see infra note 55.
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Increasing appreciation of the problems with student loans, including the racialjustice dimension of these problems,18 has sparked much scholarly reflection. Some
have proposed relatively narrow remedies, such as raising public awareness of
bankruptcy relief19 and making such relief substantively and procedurally easier to
obtain.20 Others have offered intellectually ambitious reconceptualizations of student
loan debt21 or of the government’s use of debt to achieve social goals in general.22
But student loan jubilee stands out among all these proposals as a strikingly bold
action that potentially can be taken immediately.
This Article examines two legal questions that are critical for executive loan
forgiveness. The first is whether the Higher Education Act (“HEA”) authorizes the
executive to order a jubilee for at least some student loans.23 Applying the textualist
approach to statutory interpretation currently ascendant in the federal courts, the
Article concludes the answer is probably “yes.” The textual arguments against
jubilee that have been offered to date are weak. The nontextual arguments, though
analytically stronger, are likely to get short shrift in today’s federal courts. Here,
Luke Herrine, a Ph.D. student at Yale Law School, and the Harvard team previously
mentioned—Eileen Connor, Deanne Loonin, and Toby Merrill (“the CLM group”)—
have laid out the basic case24: this Article’s contribution is to evaluate criticisms of
these authors’ reasoning and to do so through a textualist lens.

18. See Dalié Jiménez & Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt Is a Civil Rights Issue: The Case for Debt Relief
and Higher Education Reform, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 131, 132 (2020) (“Student debt plays an
increasingly significant role in perpetuating the subordination of Black and Latinx people in the United States.”).
19. Jason Iuliano, The Student Loan Bankruptcy Gap, 70 DUKE L.J. 497, 500 (2020) (“[A]ny
comprehensive solution must . . . encourage individuals to assert their legal rights” to bankruptcy discharge).
20. See Pamela Foohey et al., Essay, Changing the Student Loan Dischargeability Framework: How the
Department of Education Can Ease the Path for Borrowers in Bankruptcy, 106 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1,
1, 11–12 (2021) (arguing that Department should adopt a presumptive position of not contesting bankruptcy
discharge of student loans); John Patrick Hunt, Reforming Student Loan Bankruptcy Procedure, 73
BAYLOR L. REV. 355 (2021) (proposing shifting burden of proof to creditors in student loan bankruptcies); John
Patrick Hunt, Student Loan Purpose and the Brunner Test, 15 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237 (2020) (proposing
reformulating “undue hardship” standard applicable to student loan bankruptcies to permit middle-class
lifestyles); Matthew Bruckner et al., A No-Contest Discharge for Uncollectible Student Loans, 91
UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 183 (2020) (proposing that Department consent to student loan bankruptcy discharge in
certain situations, such as where the borrower experiences disability or prolonged poverty); Dalié Jiménez et
al., Comments of Bankruptcy Scholars on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims in Bankruptcy, 21
J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 114 (2018).
21. See John R. Brooks & Adam J. Levitin, Redesigning Education Finance: How Student Loans Outgrew
the “Debt” Paradigm, 109 GEO. L.J. 5, 11 (2020) (advocating abandoning debt paradigm of education finance
in favor of “grant-and-tax” paradigm).
22. See Abbye Atkinson, Borrowing Equality, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1411 (2020) (“[A] progressive
credit policy is necessarily limited when combined with a restrictive debt policy that does not account for how
structural inequality meaningfully inhibits cash flow and reinforces and exacerbates existing social
inequality.”); Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1099 (2019)
(“Credit is fundamentally incompatible with the entrenched intergenerational poverty that plagues low-income
Americans.”).
23. See discussion infra Part II.
24. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 367–78; CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 3–6. Merrill has recently taken a
position as Deputy General Counsel in the Department of Education. See U.S. Department of Education
Announces More Biden-Harris Appointees, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 6, 2021),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-announces-more-biden-harris-appointees-2.
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The second issue addressed by the Article arises if the Secretary of Education
(“Secretary”) is authorized to cancel at last some student loans. Given that
assumption, the next question is whether the Secretary’s jubilee authority covers all
federal student loans rather than just a relatively small subset.25 From a textualist
perspective, this question likely turns on whether the Secretary’s jubilee authority, or
the potential use of that authority, is among the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of
student loans.26 This Article offers a qualified “yes” as the probable answer
here.While others such as Herrine and the CLM group have discussed the key
statutory provisions of the HEA Act,27 this Article expands upon previous scholars’
treatment.
The Article advances the debate over the executive’s jubilee authority in three
ways. First, it demonstrates the importance of the meaning of “terms, conditions, and
benefits,” and it extends the analysis of that phrase’s meaning in the HEA. Second,
it engages with critiques of jubilee authority, which no law review article has done to
date. Third, it seeks to refocus the debate to emphasize textual arguments that are
likely to be more persuasive to federal courts.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I recounts the main argument that jubilee
is authorized for all federal student loans. In brief, it runs as follows: Provisions
governing one older federal student loan program, the Federal Family Education
Loan Program (“FFELP”), expressly authorize the Secretary to “compromise, waive,
or release”28 federal claims and to “consent to modification” of student loan
obligations.29 The Article refers to the Secretary’s power to compromise, waive,
release, and modify FFELP loans as “relinquishment authority.”
Assuming the Secretary has authority to forgive FFELP loans, the next question
is whether that authority extends to the much larger30 and currently active31 Direct
Loan Program (“DLP”). Two provisions of the HEA state or imply that DLP loans
have, with specified exceptions, the “same terms, conditions, and benefits” as FFELP
loans.32 Following the CLM group, the Article calls these the “parity provision[s].”33
Under the parity provisions, if the executive’s relinquishment authority, or the
possibility that loans might be cancelled under that authority, or both, are within the
“terms, conditions, and benefits” of FFELP loans, they are also within the “terms,
conditions, and benefits” of DLP loans, and the executive may unilaterally cancel
loans made under that program.
25. See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
26. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087a(b)(2), 1087e(a)(1).
27. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 370–71; CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 3.
28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6).
29. See id. § 1082(a)(4).
30. As of the end of the second quarter of 2021, the total outstanding balance on FFELP loans was $238.8
billion, and the total outstanding balance on DLP loans was $1,348.3 billion. See Federal Student Loan
Portfolio
Summary,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/PortfolioSummary.xls (last updated Mar. 31,
2021) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Fed. Stud. Loan Summary].
31. Congress terminated the issuance of new loans under the FFELP as of June 30, 2010. See 20 U.S.C. §
1071(d)(1).
32. Id. §§ 1087a(b)(2), 1087e(a)(1).
33. See CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 3 n.5.
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Part II evaluates the argument in Part I that jubilee authority exists and the
criticisms of that argument. After a brief overview of the criticisms in Part II.A, Part
II makes two major points. First, a committed textualist would probably reject the
arguments made to date that the HEA does not authorize jubilee at all. The textualist
arguments, addressed in Parts II.B and II.C, are relatively weak, and nontextualist
arguments, addressed in Part II.D, would likely be disregarded given the plain
language of the statute. Part II.E addresses arguments against jubilee that are based
not on the HEA, but rather on the Constitution or regulations. The Article observes,
based on what has appeared to date, that jubilee proponents probably have the better
of these arguments. The apparent weakness of the arguments that jubilee authority
is nonexistent highlights the importance of understanding what loans that authority
applies to, assuming it does exist.
Part III turns to the analysis of whether jubilee power extends to DLP loans. Part
III.A surveys the view of the Department of Education (“the Department”)
concerning whether its powers over the FFEL Program extend to direct loans. The
Department has consistently taken the position that they do, but apparently it has
never given an explanation for this position rooted in the statute’s language. Part
III.B describes judicial opinions that have addressed whether FFEL authorities cover
the DLP. Although a number of courts have adopted the Department’s view of the
matter, and there is little contrary judicial authority, the issue does not appear to have
been contested, and courts, like the Department, have not given a textually based
explanation for their conclusions.
Part IV addresses whether the Department’s jubilee power extends to the DLP
through the parity provisions. In other words, it asks whether the jubilee power, or
the prospect of its exercise, is part of the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of FFELP
loans. In brief, it concludes that jubilee power probably, but not certainly, covers
direct loans.
Part IV.A considers whether “terms, conditions, and benefits” is used in the
parity provisions as a discrete phrase with a distinct meaning. Finding no evidence
that this is the case—and finding little guidance on the boundaries of what the phrase
would cover—the Article turns to the analysis of the phrase’s components. Part IV.B
addresses whether the prospect of relief under the relinquishment power is a “benefit”
FFELP loans offer borrowers. Based on the plain meaning of “benefit” and the
statute’s use of “benefit” to describe loan cancellation generally, among other items,
Part IV.B concludes that the opportunity to have one’s loans cancelled in the exercise
of relinquishment authority is probably a “benefit” of FFELP loans.
Part IV.C analyzes whether relinquishment authority is part of the “terms and
conditions” of FFELP loans. The statute refers to the adjustment of repayment plans
as part of the “terms and conditions” of Title IV loans. Moreover, FFELP promissory
notes, in providing “information about the terms and conditions” of FFELP loans,
note the possibility of loan cancellation. And contracts generally are deemed to
incorporate the relevant statutory background. Accordingly, it is likely that
relinquishment authority is part of the “terms and conditions” of FFELP loans.
Part IV.D addresses the possibility that relinquishment authority is a “term” of
FFELP loans. Although “term” is often subsumed within “terms and conditions,”
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important contract-law sources, including Corbin’s leading treatise, the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, and the Uniform Commercial Code, all define “term” standing
on its own. Relinquishment authority probably fits all three definitions of “term,”
and the HEA refers to the Secretary’s authority to waive certain repayments as a
“term” of an agreement. Thus, if “term” has a meaning distinct from “terms and
conditions,” relinquishment authority probably fits into it as well.
Part IV.E takes up the possibility that the nonexercise of relinquishment authority
might be a “condition” of FFELP loans. It concludes that although such nonexercise
may fit both the dictionary and the specialized contract-law meanings of “condition,”
that word apparently has not been used to describe the one contract party’s
nonexercise of its right to release the other from contractual duties.
Part IV.F considers whether relinquishment authority applies to DLP loans
because it is a “term, condition, or benefit” of the FFEL Program, even if it is not a
“term or condition” of FFELP loan contracts or a “benefit” of FFELP loans under the
ordinary meaning of “benefit.” Program “terms and conditions” typically encompass
all the rules governing a program, so relinquishment authority could fit this
definition. Relinquishment authority could also be a program “benefit,” in the sense
of financial aid provided, or potentially provided, under a program.
Part IV.G addresses two remaining textual issues with the meaning of “terms,
conditions, and benefits” in the parity provisions. It demonstrates that the HEA’s
structure supports the idea that FFELP powers extend to the DLP. The HEA provides
the Secretary with detailed, explicit authorities for operating the FFELP but not the
DLP. Instead, the DLP has the parity provision, which is sensibly interpreted as
filling in the gaps in DLP authorities. Finally, Part IV.G explains that not all FFELP
powers can apply to the DLP, as some are specific to the FFELP’s unique structure
and do not make sense in the context of the DLP. Thus, “same terms, conditions, and
benefits” has a limited scope of application. This is not a problem for jubilee,
however, as relinquishment authority makes sense in the context of both the FFELP
and the DLP.
To be sure, there are some doubts about whether relinquishment authority applies
to direct loans. The statute does not appear to refer expressly and specifically to
relinquishment authority as part of the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of FFELP
loans. Nor does the statute expressly define that phrase or any of its constituent parts.
FFELP loan “benefits” could conceivably have some technical meaning that excludes
relinquishment authority. Or perhaps only executed loan forgiveness, not just the
possibility of loan forgiveness, counts as a “benefit.” Perhaps the fact that
relinquishment authority arises from statute rather than the loan agreement excludes
it from the “terms and conditions” (and the “terms,” and the “conditions”) of the
contract. And maybe the argument based on the rules of the FFEL Program fails
because those rules are not necessarily included in the “terms, conditions, and
benefits” of loans made under the program.
Nevertheless, the textual case for jubilee authority over direct loans appears on
balance to be stronger than the case against it. Moreover, there is no obvious reason
for the Secretary’s authority over DLP loans to be more limited than the authority
over FFELP loans. In other words, although the argument that the Secretary’s jubilee
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authority extends to direct loans may not be airtight, there seems to be little
affirmative reason to find that the authority does not extend so far.

I. SETTING THE STAGE: THE TEXTUAL ARGUMENT FOR
JUBILEE AUTHORITY
Part I lays out the main argument advocates have made for the legality of jubilee.
It shows that the interpretation of the statutory phrase “terms, conditions, and
benefits” is crucial to the argument that jubilee authority extends to loans made under
the Direct Loan Program.
Herrine34 and the CLM authors35 have laid out a straightforward textual
argument that the executive has the power to cancel student loans without further
congressional action. They point out36 that the Higher Education Act of 1965
(“HEA”) provides as follows, granting the power to “compromise,” “waive,”
“release,” and “modify” certain student loans (“relinquishment authority”):
(a) In the performance of, and with respect to, the functions,
powers, and duties vested in him by this part, the Secretary may—
....
(4) subject to the specific limitations in this part, consent to
modification, with respect to rate of interest, time of payment of any
installment of principal and interest or any portion thereof, or any other
provision of any note or other instrument evidencing a loan which has
been insured by the Secretary under this part;
....
(6) enforce, pay, compromise, waive, or release any right, title,
claim, lien, or demand, however acquired, including any equity or any
right of redemption.37
The power, “with respect[] to the functions, powers, and duties” of title IV, part
B of the HEA to “waive . . . or release any . . . claim . . . however acquired” would
seem to include the power to cancel student debt. The powers to “compromise”
claims and “modif[y] . . . any . . . provision of any note or other instrument
evidencing a loan” also seem likely to authorize loan cancellation, although this
conclusion may be more debatable. Thus, the grant of relinquishment authority

34. See Herrine, supra note 1.
35. See CLM Letter, supra note 3.
36. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 342; CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 3. Others have discussed these
provisions in connection with the Department’s authority to consent to discharge of student loans in bankruptcy.
See John Patrick Hunt, Consent to Student Loan Bankruptcy Discharge, 95 IND. L.J. 1137, 1179–80 (2020)
[hereinafter Hunt I].
37. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(4), (a)(6) (emphasis added). The HEROES Act authorizes the Secretary to
“waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision . . . under title IV of the [HEA] as the Secretary deems
necessary in connection with a war or other military operation or national emergency.” Id. § 1098bb(a)(1).
Given the Covid-19 emergency, it is possible that this provision could also provide a basis for loan cancellation.
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seems to be an unambiguous and explicit grant of authority to cancel loans within its
scope.
The more difficult issue is determining just what those loans are. Relinquishment
authority arguably is limited to loans made under the Federal Family Education Loan
Program, which has not made new loans since 2010.38 Thus, relinquishment
authority may not extend to loans made under the still active and much larger39
Federal Direct Loan Program.
Relinquishment is authorized “[i]n the performance of, and with respect to, the
functions, powers, and duties, vested in [the Secretary] by this part[.]”40 The
reference to “this part” in the quoted text is to Part B of Chapter 28, Subchapter IV
of the U.S. Code, titled “Federal Family Education Loan Program” and containing
rules for the FFELP.41 Part D of the subchapter, which governs the Direct Loan
Program, contains no analogous explicit grant of authority.42 (The Article refers to
these as Part B and Part D of Title IV of the HEA, or simply as Part B and Part D.)
Thus, the Secretary’s relinquishment43 authority may not extend to DLP loans.
As Herrine,44 the CLM group,45 and others46 have pointed out, provisions within
Part D of Title IV of the HEA arguably carry relinquishment authority over to direct
loans. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(1) within Part D provides, “[u]nless otherwise specified
in this part, loans made to borrowers under this part shall have the same terms,
conditions, and benefits, and be available in the same amounts, as loans made to
borrowers, and first disbursed on June 30, 2010, under §§ 1078, 1078-2, 1078-3, and
1078-8 of this title.”47 The enumerated sections all appear in Part B and govern
FFELP loans,48 so any item that is part of the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of all
FFELP loans would be part of the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of direct loans as
well.
20 U.S.C. § 1087a(b)(2), also within Part D, provides, “loans made to borrowers
under this part that, except as otherwise specified in this part, have the same terms,
conditions, and benefits as loans made to borrowers under section 1078 of this title,
shall be known as ‘Federal Direct Stafford/Ford Loans.’”49 Although this provision
38. See id. § 1071(d)(1). (“[N]o new loans . . . may be made or insured under this part [Part B of Title IV,
governing the FFELP] after June 30, 2010.”); see also infra note 39 and accompanying text.
39. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Fed. Stud. Loan Summary, supra note 30 (reporting that DLP loans have an
outstanding balance more than five times that of FFELP loans).
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a).
41. See id. §§ 1071–1087-4.
42. See id. §§ 1087a–1087j.
43. Herrine discusses potential interpretations of “compromise,” “waive,” “release,” and “modify” that
give each term a distinct meaning and avoid surplusage. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 373–75. In addition, the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that a “release” is a written instrument discharging a contractual
duty that takes effect immediately upon delivery unless made conditional. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 284 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
44. Herrine, supra note 1, at 370.
45. CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 3.
46. See Hunt I, supra note 36, at 1180–81.
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(1) (2021). The clause “first disbursed on June 30, 2010,” id., presumably reflects
the fact that that was the last date under which FFELP lending was permitted. See id. § 1071(b).
48. See id. §§ 1078, 1078-2, 1078-3, 1078-8.
49. Id. § 1087a(b)(2)(A).
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just seems to give a program a name, the Department and courts have relied on it to
extend the Department’s FFELP powers to the DLP.50 At a minimum, § 1087a(b)(2)
underscores the idea that DLP loans have the same terms, conditions, and benefits as
FFELP loans.
Thus, if the Secretary’s relinquishment authority, or the possibility of benefiting
from that authority, is part of the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of FFELP loans,
the authority, or the opportunity to benefit from it, apparently would also be part of
the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of direct loans.51 The Secretary would be
legally authorized to order jubilee.

II. TEXTUALISM AND THE EXISTENCE OF JUBILEE
AUTHORITY
Part II argues that under a textualist approach to statutory interpretation,
relinquishment authority should be interpreted to cover a federal student loan jubilee,
despite the objections jubilee opponents and skeptics have raised. After all, there is
a strong case that authority to “waive . . . or release any . . . claim” includes the
authority to order a jubilee. The part begins with a high-level overview of the
critiques of jubilee authority in Part II.A, then considers textualist arguments in detail
in Part II.B. Part II.C addresses the bridge between textualist and nontextualist
arguments: the claim that the statute is ambiguous. Part II.D evaluates nontextualist
arguments against jubilee authority that are based on the HEA. Part II.E briefly
addresses arguments against jubilee authority that are not based on interpreting the
HEA. This last topic is potentially quite involved, and the Article confines its
discussion of that particular area to evaluating the arguments others have made to
date.
A. Overview of Jubilee Critiques and Importance of Textual Analysis
The preceding section set forth the leading argument supporting the Secretary’s
authority to order a federal student loan jubilee. It appears that two major critiques
of that argument exist. One is laid out in a memorandum prepared by the Department
of Education’s Office of the General Counsel for the outgoing secretary, Betsy
DeVos.52 The memorandum flatly concludes that jubilee is not authorized.53 The
other is a short piece in the Regulatory Review by Harvard Law School’s Professor

50. See discussion infra Parts III.A–III.B.
51. See CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 3; Hunt I, supra note 36, at 1180–81.
52. See Memorandum from Reed D. Rubinstein, Principal Deputy Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Off.
of the Gen. Couns. to Betsy DeVos, Educ. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 1–8 (Jan. 12, 2021), reprinted in Colin
Mark, May the Executive Branch Forgive Student Loan Debt Without Further Congressional Action?, app. B
(Harv. L. Sch. Briefing Papers on Fed. Budget Policy, Briefing Paper No. 74, Apr. 2021) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3819989) [hereinafter OGC Memo].
53. See OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 1.
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Howell Jackson and his student, Colin Mark;54 this contribution draws on another
paper by Mark.55 It presents a more nuanced analysis, identifying “considerable . . .
legal risks” with proceeding “precipitously” with jubilee.56
Most of the criticism of the pro-jubilee argument so far has been along the lines
that relinquishment authority does not extend to jubilee, rather than that
relinquishment authority does not extend to all student loans issued under federal
programs. For example, Jackson and Mark argue that the grant of relinquishment
authority is ambiguous57 in that it could provide either “plenary compromise
authority”—or what this Article calls “jubilee authority”58 or “constrained
compromise authority.”59 The authors contend that although the boundaries of the
latter “are not clearly defined,” constrained compromise authority includes only the
power to make individualized decisions about loan cancellation based on the
borrower’s inability to pay or other equitable considerations.60 Presumably, under
this interpretation of the Secretary’s authority, the Secretary would thus be unable to
order jubilee.
The OGC Memo, eschewing ambiguity, argues that it is clear that the HEA grants
only constrained compromise authority to use Jackson and Marks’ terms. The Memo
asserts that U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) “is best construed as a limited authorization for the
Secretary to provide cancellation, compromise, discharge, or forgiveness only on a
case-by-case basis and then only under those circumstances specified by
Congress.”61
In evaluating these criticisms, textualist analyses of student loan jubilee are
critical. The federal courts and the Supreme Court have turned decisively toward
textualist interpretation in a process that has been going on since the late 1980s.62 As
Justice Elena Kagan stated with perhaps only slight exaggeration a few years ago,
“[W]e’re all textualists now.”63 At the least, textualism means that a statute’s purpose
54. Howell Jackson & Colin Mark, Executive Authority to Forgive Student Loans Is Not So Simple, REGUL.
REV., (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/04/19/jackson-mark-executive-authority-forgivestudent-loans-not-simple/.
55. Mark, supra note 52.
56. Jackson & Mark, supra note 54.
57. See id. (“The language of the HEA itself is ambiguous.”).
58. See id. (arguing that if the Secretary has “plenary compromise authority,” they can “forgive any amount
of student debt, including debts of borrowers perfectly capable of repaying their loans.”) (emphasis omitted).
59. See id. (emphasis omitted).
60. See id. (“[C]onstrained compromise authority” could be used only “where borrowers lack the financial
capacity to service their student loans or other equitable considerations warrant debt relief.”).
61. OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 4 (internal citations omitted).
62. See Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265 (2020) (“[T]extualism has in recent
decades gained considerable prominence within the federal judiciary”); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory
Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme
Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–7 (2018) (“[A]lthough the lower courts and the Supreme Court all shifted toward
textualist tools starting in the late-1980s, the change was dampened and less transformative at each step further
down the judicial hierarchy.”); John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 22 (2014) (“In the Rehnquist-Roberts era, the Court has firmly forsworn its Holy Trinity power in
favor of a more textualist approach.”).
63. Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, HARV.
L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutoryinterpretation.
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cannot trump its text,64 but the Supreme Court has gone farther than that. As
Professor Tara Leigh Grove has noted, the recent Supreme Court decisions in
Bostock65 and McGirt66 cases mark the rise of “formalistic textualism,” which
“emphasizes semantic context, rather than social or policy context, and downplays
the practical consequences of a decision.”67 The Article discusses these cases
below.68 In general, this Article takes as its guide to textualism the treatise Reading
Law,69 coauthored by “the leading theorist as well as practitioner of what has been
dubbed the new textualism,”70 the late Justice Scalia. That work is cited throughout.
It might be argued that it is inappropriate to focus on the federal courts’ approach
to statutory interpretation because no one has standing to challenge jubilee in federal
court. This appears incorrect, however. For example, federal loan servicers are
compensated based on the volume of loans they service.71 Mass elimination of
federal loans would therefore seem to reduce servicers’ contractual compensation (to
zero). The loss of benefits that a party otherwise would receive under a contract is
economic injury sufficient for standing.72 The Department documents on the legality
of executive debt cancellation released in August 2021 reveal that the authors of the
analysis were in fact concerned about “litigation risk.”73 And previous commentators
on jubilee have cited federal case law extensively, thus recognizing the importance
of the judiciary’s approach to the relevant legal questions.74

64. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
16–17 (2012).
65. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020).
66. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2469 (2020).
67. See Grove, supra note 62, at 269. Grove argues that federal judges should use this interpretive mode
because it constrains them from simply following policy preferences. See id.
68. See discussion infra Part II.D.
69. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64.
70. William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism and Normative Canons, Book Review: Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts, by Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (2013).
71. See, e.g., AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT BETWEEN DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION AND GREAT LAKES EDUCATIONAL LOAN SERVICES, INC., at 4 (Sept. 1, 2014),
https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/ED-FSA-09-D-0012_MOD_0080_GreatLakes.pdf (providing “unit
rates” for servicing federal student loans).
72. See Umbehr v. McClure, 44 F.3d 876, 878–79 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, Board of Cty. Comm’rs
v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (government contractor whose contract was terminated allegedly in retaliation
for exercise of First Amendment rights had standing to sue, although termination was “valid” under the terms
of the contract itself); 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
3531.4 (3d ed. 2008) (“Generally, pecuniary or economic injury is a legally protected interest.”).
73. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Debt Cancellation Analysis Documents, supra note 15, at 43.
74. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 343–67 (citing federal caselaw extensively in arguing that jubilee would
be an unreviewable exercise of discretion); OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 1–8 (citing federal caselaw
throughout in support of argument that jubilee is not authorized).
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B. Textual Arguments Based on the Higher Education Act
The OGC Memo announces its fealty to textualist principles75 and acknowledges
that a straightforward (or, to quote the memo, “hyperliteral,”)76 reading of the HEA
supports a finding of jubilee authority. Nevertheless, the memo advances two
textualist reasons the statute should not be read to authorize jubilee: doing so
supposedly would (1) “swallow up and render surplusage many Title IV
provisions”77 and (2) “needlessly create” constitutional issues.78 At least as the OGC
Memo presents these arguments, neither is convincing under current law.
1. The Specific and the General
The OGC Memo argues that the Secretary cannot cancel federal student loans en
masse because the Higher Education Act contains many specific loan cancellation
provisions, and “the specific governs the general.”79 Jackson and Mark also point to
the existence of targeted forgiveness, cancellation, and repayment assistance
provision as a problem for jubilee authority, although they describe the issue as a
“contextual” one and argue from administrative practice. They suggest that if the
Secretary of Education had jubilee authority, previous secretaries would not have
treated the limits on these specific programs as binding because they could have
forgiven any federal student loans they wanted.80
The OGC Memo’s argument seems misplaced. The Memo quotes at length the
late Justice Scalia’s opinion in Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank.81 The
quotation explains that the specific-versus-general canon applies when the scope of
a general provision must be limited to give a specific provision some scope of
operation and save it from superfluity.82
That idea does not apply to the relationship between relinquishment authority
and more specific loan cancellation programs. That is because, with one exception
to be discussed, the “specific” grants of authority the OGC cites are mandatory, while
the general grant of relinquishment power is permissive. Jubilee proponents can
simply argue in response that the Secretary may forgive all FFELP and DLP loans
using the relinquishment power and must forgive some loans under more specific
provisions. There is no need to limit the relinquishment power to save the provisions
for specific cancellation programs from surplusage.

75. OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 2 (“The nature and scope of the Secretary’s HEA authority is determined
by construing the relevant statutory text in accordance with its ordinary public meaning at the time of
enactment.”) (citing Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020)).
76. See OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 3.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3–4, 6.
80. See Jackson & Mark, supra note 54; see also Mark, supra note 52, at 23–24.
81. See OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 3–4; see also Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S.
639 (2012).
82. See Gateway Hotel, LLC, 566 U.S. at 645.
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Consider the citations to specific loan forgiveness programs that the OGC Memo
gives.83 One states that borrowers who meet certain requirements “shall be eligible
for deferment.”84 Another provides that the Secretary “shall specify” criteria for
borrowers’ defense to repayment.85 A third does not appear to exist in the current
U.S. Code.86
Other examples of specific instructions to the Secretary to forgive certain loans,
not cited by OGC in this context, include the mandates that the Secretary “shall
cancel” the debt of borrowers who complete the requirements of PSLF,87 that
borrowers “shall be eligible for deferment” under certain circumstances,88 that the
Secretary “shall repay or cancel any outstanding balance” for borrowers that
complete income-based repayment plans,89 that the Secretary “shall develop and
make available a simple method for borrowers to apply for loan cancellation” under
TEPSLF,90 and that the Secretary “shall discharge” certain loans when the borrower
dies or becomes permanently disabled,91 or in certain circumstances when a school
closes, falsely certifies borrower eligibility, or fails to pay a refund due to a lender.92
The pandemic-relief CARES Act might be interpreted as providing for a limited form
of debt cancellation, and it does so in mandatory terms. It provides that the Secretary
“shall suspend all payments due”93 for a certain period and that interest “shall not
accrue”94 during that period.
The only clearly discretionary provision95 the OGC Memo cites is U.S.C. §
1098(a)a, found in the HEROES Act, which provides that the Secretary “may waive
or modify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student financial
assistance programs under Title IV of the Act as the Secretary “deems necessary” to
achieve certain goals.96 But this provision is not specific relative to the grant of
relinquishment authority. It encompasses all aspects of the student loan programs
(“any . . . provision”), not just modification or cancellation of loans. For example,
the Department has used its HEROES Act authority during the Covid-19 emergency
to permit accrediting agencies to conduct virtual site visits,97 allow institutions to
offer virtual classes, and allow foreign medical school graduates to receive loans
83. See OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 3.
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(f)(1).
85. See id. § 1087e(h).
86. See OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 3 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1094(b)(3)).
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1).
88. See id. § 1087e(f)(1).
89. Id. § 1098e(b)(7); see also id. § 1087(d)(1)(D), (E) (Secretary “shall offer” income-driven repayment
plans); id. § 1098e(b) (Secretary “shall carry out a program” for income-based repayment).
90. Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, § 315, 122 Stat. 348, 752 (2018).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a)(1).
92. See id. § 1087(c)(1).
93. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. 116-136, § 3513(a), 134 Stat. 281,
404 (2020).
94. Id. § 3513(b).
95. 20 U.S.C. § 1078-12(d) may be interpreted as a narrow grant of discretionary waiver authority but may
be better read as a disclosure mandate. See id. § 1078-12(d)(1) (requiring that agreements between borrower
and Secretary contain certain items).
96. Id. § 1098bb(a)(1).
97. See Federal Student Aid Programs, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,856, 79,857 (2020).
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without reporting MCAT scores.98 None of these matters has to do with the
compromise, waiver, release, or modification of outstanding loans. There is no need
to exclude jubilee from relinquishment authority to give effect to U.S.C. § 1098(a)a.
Thus, the existence of specific loan cancellation programs does not weigh against
finding jubilee authority on the ground that the specific governs the general.
2. Avoidance of Constitutional Doubt
Statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional doubt,99 and the OGC
Memo suggests that this doctrine obstructs jubilee.100 The OGC Memo suggests that
jubilee raises questions under the Appropriations Clause,101 and Jackson and Mark
refer to questions raised by the Property Clause.102 Although the doctrine of
avoidance of constitutional doubt may seem nontextualist because it introduces issues
that may not bear on how an ordinary user of English would understand the relevant
text, authorities on the subject assure us that it is, in fact, a textualist doctrine.103 A
full first-principles analysis of the constitutional issues raised by federal student loan
jubilee is beyond the scope of this Article. However, as the OGC Memo lays those
issues out, it does not appear that the avoidance-of-doubt principle applies to the
question of whether relinquishment authority encompasses jubilee power.
The doctrine of avoidance of constitutional doubt is irrelevant because the
question here is not whether jubilee is constitutional, but rather, whether it is
congressionally authorized. The avoidance doctrine would be relevant if it were
unconstitutional for Congress to empower the executive to forgive debts on a
widespread basis. That would be a reason to interpret the HEA not to authorize
jubilee. But the OGC Memo identifies no reason that Congress may not
constitutionally grant the executive jubilee authority and therefore no basis for
“constitutional doubt” if Congress has in fact done so. Instead, the Appropriations
and Property Clauses forbid the executive to forgive debts to the United States
without congressional authorization.104 If Congress has granted the executive jubilee
98. See id.
99. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 247–61
100. OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 2.
101. Id. at 1. The Appropriations Clause provides: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
102. The Property Clause provides: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting . . . Property belonging to the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2. Although Jackson and Mark do not explicitly invoke the doctrine of avoidance of constitutional doubt,
their claim that a clear-statement rule applies to jubilee seems likely to be based on this principle. See Jackson
& Mark, supra note 54.
103. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 247–51 (noting that a “more plausible” interpretation
of the canon than that it is based on a “genuine assessment of probable meaning,” is that it “represents judicial
policy, a judgment that statutes ought not to tread on questionable constitutional grounds unless they do so
clearly.”).
104. See Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941) (“Power to release or otherwise
dispose of the rights and property of the United States is lodged in the Congress . . . . Subordinate officers of
the United States are without that power, save only as it has been conferred upon them by Act of Congress or
is to be inferred from other powers so granted.”); see also CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 1 (addressing this issue
directly). As for the Appropriations Clause, the CLM Letter argues that Congress has expressly excluded
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authority, jubilee is authorized and apparently creates no constitutional problem
under the Appropriations and Property Clauses of the United States Constitution.
Both Herrine and Mark point out a different, arguably more important,
constitutional problem with jubilee authority: the nondelegation doctrine.105 That
doctrine requires that Congress provide an “intelligible principle” for the executive
to follow when exercising delegated legislative authority.106
However, as Herrine points out,107 the nondelegation doctrine has been applied
quite permissively since the New Deal era: the Supreme Court has not used it to
invalidate a statute since 1935.108 The Court has upheld broad delegations of
authority, such as to set prices,109 to regulate broadcasters “in the public interest,”110
and to set “just and reasonable” power rates.111 Thus, under current law, the
nondelegation doctrine does not raise much constitutional doubt to avoid.
But, as Herrine observes,112 several justices have expressed interest in
revitalizing the doctrine,113 particularly with respect to requiring clear statements to
find delegations of authority to resolve major policy questions.114 Whether and how
the current Supreme Court will strengthen the nondelegation remains speculative.
Notably, even if the Court does demand a clear delegation because the decision to
undertake a federal loan jubilee is so momentous, the delegation of authority to
“waive . . . or release any . . . claim”115 seems clear.
C. Ambiguity and Contextual Evidence
As noted, Jackson and Mark argue that the grant of relinquishment authority is
ambiguous in that it can be read to grant either “plenary” or “constrained compromise
authority.”116 If the Secretary enjoys only what Jackson and Mark call “constrained
compromise authority,” arguably loans could be cancelled only on an individual
basis, and jubilee would be unlawful.117

federal student loan programs from the requirement of annual appropriations. See CLM Letter, supra note 3,
at 6. Neither OGC nor Jackson and Mark rebut this contention. See discussion infra Part II.E.
105. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 398; Mark, supra note 52, at 27.
106. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019).
107. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 398.
108. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130.
109. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944).
110. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943).
111. See Fed. Power Co. v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944).
112. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 398.
113. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133–42 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court’s application of
nondelegation doctrine in recent decades); id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court were
willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”).
114. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting denial of
certiorari) (recounting Justice Rehnquist’s view that delegation of authority over major policy questions requires
that Congress “expressly and specifically delegate to the agency the authority both to decide the major policy
question and to regulate and enforce”).
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6).
116. See Jackson & Mark, supra note 54.
117. See id.
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But the text that Jackson and Mark focus on does not seem all that likely to be
found ambiguous. They assert that powers to “compromise” and “modify” may not
encompass jubilee, and then seem to argue that that in turn creates an ambiguity as
to whether the powers to “release” and “waive” include the power to declare a
jubilee.118 But, as noted, U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) confers the power to “compromise,
waive, or release any . . . claim.”119 There is no indication that a waiver or release
must also be a compromise or modification. Indeed, the surplusage canon counsels
that each term should have a distinct meaning.120 Thus, if some of the Secretary’s
powers have particular limits, that says nothing about whether other powers have the
same limits.121
Moreover, contrary to Jackson and Mark’s suggestion that cancellation may be
permitted only for “can’t-pay” or other special borrowers, the statute explicitly
authorizes waiver or release of “any” claim. Especially given that the specificversus-general and avoidance-of-constitutional-doubt canons do not support the
argument against jubilee,122 the statute simply does not seem to leave much room to
argue that authorization to “waive” “any” “claim” is not authorization to waive any
claim.
The same absence of ambiguity means that jubilee proponents need not fret over
any notion that courts require a clear statement of authorization to dispose of claims
owned by the United States.123 Jackson and Mark assert that “the courts have
demanded that executive authority to spend federal dollars be explicitly granted to
agencies and not inferred from ambiguous statutes or by implication.”124 It is not
obvious that waiving or releasing a federal claim is “spend[ing] federal dollars” in
the sense Jackson and Mark use the term. After all, no federal money changes hands
when the government decides not to collect direct loans.125 But more fundamentally,
the grant of authority here is clear: “may . . . waive . . . or release any . . . claim.”
Presumably, Jackson and Mark argue for ambiguity in part to open the door to
the “contextual”126 arguments they present against jubilee. After all, if the statutory
text is plain, there is no room for extratextual considerations.127 Despite the
118. See id. (contrasting “open-ended language” of “release” and “waive” with possibly more restricted
meanings of “compromise” and “modify”).
119. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) (emphasis added).
120. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 174–79.
121. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) empowers the Secretary to “enforce, pay, compromise, waive, or release”
claims. The broad spectrum of authorities rebuts any suggestion that “waive” and “release” should be limited
by the principle of noscitur a sociis. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 195–98 (discussing principle of
noscitur a sociis).
122. See discussion supra Part II.B.
123. See Mark, supra note 52, at 14 (executive debt forgiveness requires a “clear statutory basis”).
124. Jackson & Mark, supra note 54.
125. Perhaps “loans” disbursed with no intention to collect might be considered disguised spending, but that
does not imply that a change of mind about collecting outstanding loans is itself spending.
126. See Jackson & Mark, supra note 54 (“At least four contextual considerations . . . weigh against” finding
of “plenary compromise authority”).
127. See, e.g., McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2469 (2020) (“There is no need to consult extratextual
sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is clear. Nor may extratextual sources overcome those terms.”);
Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2282 n.6 (2016) (extratextual arguments cannot succeed “if the statute
is clear”).
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probability that the HEA is not ambiguous about granting the Secretary jubilee
authority, the Article does address Jackson and Mark’s contextual claims.
D. Nontextual Arguments Based on the Higher Education Act
The underlying idea of many arguments against jubilee authority is, in essence,
that no one ever thought the Secretary had jubilee power, so the power must not exist.
One version of this argument looks to agency interpretation and practice. Jackson
and Mark argue that in administering the HEA’s many specific loan cancellation
programs, Education Secretaries “have always proceeded under the assumption that
statutory limits” on such programs “are binding”128 and that that assumption is
incompatible with the existence of jubilee authority.
Assuming that assertion is accurate, past secretaries’ attitudes here seem to
reflect unexamined assumptions more than reasoned interpretations of the
relinquishment provisions. It appears that no agency statements predating the recent
OGC opinion affirmatively assert that jubilee is unauthorized, much less offer a
defense of that view.129 The OGC opinion itself might receive limited to no judicial
deference: it was issued outside the contexts of adjudication and notice-andcomment rulemaking,130 and judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation
may be on the wane in general.131 Even more important, the Biden administration
presumably would adopt a contrary position if it were to proceed with executive
forgiveness.132
Although the letter might be persuasive without being
authoritative,133 this Article argues throughout this Part that the memorandum’s
position on whether relinquishment authority encompasses jubilee is not persuasive.
Jackson and Mark argue that no legislative history directly supports interpreting
the statute to authorize jubilee (or what they call “plenary compromise authority”)
and that such an interpretation is not needed to fulfill the purpose of relinquishment

128. See Jackson & Mark, supra note 54 (“Over the years, Education Secretaries … have always proceeded
under the assumption that statutory limits [on specialized loan forgiveness programs] are binding.”).
129. The OGC Memo states that it memorializes advice the office gave the Secretary, perhaps as early as
March 2020. See OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 1. That advice, if it was written down at all, does not appear
readily available.
130. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–30 (2000) (noting that Chevron applies only when
agency is acting to exercise interpretive authority delegated by Congress and giving adjudication and noticeand-comment rulemaking as examples of such action).
131. See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, Deference Is Dead (Long Live Chevron), 73 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 441,
441 (2021) (“Chevron is not the influential doctrine it once was and has not been for a long time . . . . In recent
years, agencies have won only a handful of statutory interpretation cases . . . . Only once since 2015 has
deference been outcome-determinative.”).
132. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (noting justification for Chevron deference
to agency interpretation based on political accountability of the executive). This justification suggests that
courts should defer to the interpretation of the current, politically accountable, administration when the
executive reverses its course.
133. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 220 (where Chevron deference to agency interpretation not available,
interpretation still entitled to “respect proportional to its power to persuade”); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (agency interpretation deserves “weight” if it has “power to persuade, if lacking power to
control”).
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authority, apparently as revealed by legislative history.134 Such support is
unnecessary where, as here, the statutory text is plain.135
In another example of argument apparently based on the premise that previously
unappreciated implications of plain text are inherently suspect, the OGC Memo
contends that interpreting relinquishment authority to authorize jubilee would “create
a paradigmatic ‘elephant in a mousehole.’”136 This oft-quoted, even “tired,”137
metaphor stands for the idea that Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of
a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions.”138
The OGC Memo’s argument here begs the question, as the Memo does not try to
show that any of the premises of the elephants-in-mouseholes maxim is met. It does
not try to show that the grant of jubilee authority over FFELP loans is “vague;” in
fact, “may . . . waive . . . any . . . claim” seems clear. It does not try to show that
relevant provision is “ancillary;” the statutory section is titled “Legal powers and
responsibilities”139 and contains many fundamental rules of the student loan
program.140 And it does not try to show that relinquishment authority, which
reportedly has been part of the student loan programs from the beginning,141 is an
“alter[ation]” of any scheme. As the Supreme Court recently asked in a different but
comparable context, “where’s the mousehole?”142
All three arguments just discussed seem to have their roots less in lack of
statutory clarity than in the view that knowledgeable people generally have not in the
past assumed that relinquishment authority authorizes jubilee. Jackson and Mark call
the no-jubilee interpretation the “traditional” view of the HEA.143 They question “the
proposition that Congress in 1965 effectively authorized the expenditure of what
could be in excess of $1 trillion of public resources over the next few years by
granting the Secretary unbridled compromise authority,”144 concluding “[t]o say the
least, that grant of authority was not explicit and is far from clear.”145 The OGC
Memo is less explicit on this point, but given the seemingly clear statutory text, the

134. See Jackson & Mark, supra note 54 (“[N]o direct evidence in the legislative history of the HEA” of
intent to confer jubilee authority; “that interpretation would not have been necessary to achieve the efficiency
goals” of providing compromise authority).
135. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2469 (2020).
136. OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 4.
137. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S. Ct. 1335, 1355 (2020).
138. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1082 (2021).
140. See, e.g., id. § 1082(a)(1) (authorizing the Secretary to “prescribe such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of this part”); id. § 1082(a)(2) (authorizing Secretary to “sue and be sued” in federal
court); id. § 1082(a)(3) (authorizing Secretary to include in federal loan insurance contracts “such terms,
conditions, and covenants relating to . . . such . . . matters as the Secretary determines to be necessary to assure
that the purposes of this part will be achieved.”).
141. See Mark, supra note 52, at 19 (asserting that relinquishment authorization seems to have “originated
a 1945 draft of amendments to the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (the ‘GI Bill’).”).
142. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020); see also Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S.
Ct. 1335, 1355 (2020) (holding relevant statutory provision “less a mousehole and more a watering hole––
exactly the sort of place we would expect to find this elephant”).
143. Jackson & Mark, supra note, at 54.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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view that relinquishment authority is a “mousehole” seems to arise from the
assumption that the authority has not previously been understood to encompass
jubilee.
But the textualist Supreme Court deemphasizes such past assumptions about the
meaning and implications of legal documents in favor of strict adherence to legal
document’s text.146 Consider the Court’s opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County,147
which holds that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and transgender
status violates the statutory ban on discrimination on account of “sex.”148 For the
majority, Justice Gorsuch addressed the argument that “because few in 1964 expected
today’s result, we should not dare admit that it follows ineluctably from the statutory
text.”149 He wrote, “That is exactly the sort of reasoning this Court has long
rejected. . . . [T]he employer’s logic impermissibly seeks to displace the plain
meaning of the law in favor of something lying behind it.”150 Putting the same point
even more bluntly, Justice Gorsuch wrote, “in the context of an unambiguous
statutory text, whether a specific application was anticipated by Congress is
irrelevant.”151
Likewise, in McGirt v. Oklahoma,152 the Court found that under the plain
meaning of relevant treaties and statutes, a reservation was established for the Creek
Nation within the boundaries of Oklahoma and was never disestablished.153 It
dismissed Oklahoma’s arguments that it was common knowledge that the reservation
did not exist and that settled practice treated it as nonexistent,154 finding that “[t]here
is no need to consult extratextual sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is
clear.”155 The opinion prompted a dissent to characterize the majority’s decision as
resting on the “improbable ground that, unbeknownst to anyone for the past century,
a huge swathe of Oklahoma is actually a Creek Indian reservation.”156 Again,
common understandings of the meaning of legal text gave way to plain meaning.
The OGC Memo contends that it is “hyperliteral and contrary to common
sense”157 to read “the Secretary may . . . release any . . . claim”158 as meaning that
the Secretary may in fact release any claim. Before the Supreme Court’s textualist
majority, such arguments may fall on deaf ears.

146. See also discussion supra Part II.A.
147. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1731.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
149. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1750. In quoting this passage, this author does not substantively endorse the
view that “few in 1964 expected today’s result.”
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1751 (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 at 212 (1998)) (internal quotations
omitted).
152. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
153. See id. at 2460–69.
154. See id. at 2468–74.
155. Id. at 2469.
156. Id. at 2482.
157. OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 3.
158. See 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6).
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E. Arguments Not Based on the Higher Education Act
A final group of arguments about jubilee authority is not based on interpreting
the HEA itself. For reasons of space, this Article does not analyze all these potential
legal obstacles to a jubilee from first principles or primary sources. But the analyses
that have been prepared to date suggest that these arguments are not particularly
strong. Arguments from outside the HEA focus on the Appropriations Clause, the
Property Clause, the Antideficiency Act, the Federal Claims Collections Act
(“FCCA”), the Federal Claims Collection Standards (“FCCS”) promulgated
thereunder, and the Department’s regulations adopting the FCCS. Each is addressed
in turn.
The OGC Memo cites the Appropriations Clause,159 which provides, “No Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law.”160 The Memo does not actually develop an argument based on the clause,
however. The CLM Letter argues that no specific congressional appropriations
action is needed to operate and modify the federal student loan programs,161 which
apparently are entitlement programs.162 It appears that the Department successfully
expanded income-driven repayment during the Obama administration without special
congressional appropriation (or other approval); those expansions were like a jubilee
in that they reduced required repayments, arguably increasing the cost of the student
loan programs.163 Tellingly, Professor Jackson, who teaches a seminar on federal
budget policy at Harvard Law School164 and whose scholarship addresses entitlement
spending,165 does not argue that executive jubilee would violate the Appropriations
Clause.
The Property Clause forbids executive officers from disposing of federal
government property unless the power to do so is “conferred upon them by Act of

159. See OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 1.
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
161. See CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 6; 2 U.S.C. § 661c(c)(1) (annual appropriation requirement for federal
loans and guarantees does not apply to “a direct loan or guarantee program that constitutes an entitlement (such
as the guaranteed student loan program)”).
162. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST, at R28 (2013), http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget13/justifications/r-loansoverview.pdf (“The
student loan programs . . . were authorized as entitlement programs in order to meet student loan demand”).
163. See Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J.
1677, 1699–1700 (2017). The estimated increases in the federal budget deficit due to the IDR expansions were
accounted for through “re-estimation” of program cost. See id. n.100. Congress has provided “permanent
indefinite authority” for re-estimates of the cost of federal direct loans and loan guarantees. See 2 U.S.C. §
661c(d); see also CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 6.
164. See Howell E. Jackson, Briefing Papers on Federal Budget Policy (current through Apr. 2021),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/briefingpapers/home (collecting papers written for Professor Howell E. Jackson’s
seminar on Federal Budget Policy, which includes Mark’s May the Executive Branch Forgive Student Loan
Debt Without Further Congressional Action?); see Mark, supra note 52.
165. See, e.g., FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY (Elizabeth
Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson, eds., 2009); Howell E. Jackson, Accounting for Social
Security and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59 (2004) (arguing for accrual accounting treatment of Social
Security entitlement); Howell E. Jackson, Reply, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 221 (2004) (replying to responses to
Accounting for Social Security).
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Congress or is to be implied from other powers so granted.”166 The affirmative
argument for jubilee authority concedes that jubilee must be congressionally
authorized and contends that it is congressionally authorized. The Property Clause’s
requirement of congressional authorization does not appear to add anything to the
analysis.
The Antideficiency Act forbids spending without an appropriation167 and
actually criminalizes knowing or willful unauthorized spending.168 As Herrine notes,
this provision apparently duplicates the proscription in the Appropriations Clause.169
Moreover, reportedly no one has ever been prosecuted under the Antideficiency
Act.170
The FCCA, the default statute governing the collection of federal claims,
provides that agencies must “try to collect a claim of the United States Government
for money . . . arising out of the activities of, or referred to, the agency.”171 But the
FCCA probably applies only where there is no separate grant of statutory settlement
authority to the agency,172 and the pro-jubilee contention is that the HEA’s
relinquishment provision is such a separate, specific grant.
Assuming the HEA does authorize jubilee, the most significant legal obstacle to
immediate action by order of the Secretary seems to be the Department’s own claims
collection regulations.173 These regulations state that “[t]he Secretary uses” the
[FCCS] “to determine whether compromise of a debt is appropriate if the debt arises
under a program administered by the Department”174 and that, as to debts arising
under Title IV student loan programs, “under the provisions of [the FCCS], the
Secretary may compromise a debt in any amount, or suspend or terminate collection
of a debt in any amount.”175 If the Department must follow the FCCS in cancelling
student loan debt, that could be a problem for jubilee, because the FCCS provide that

166. Royal Indemnity Co. v. U.S., 313 U.S. 289, 294 (1941) (cited in CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 1).
167. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A)–(B).
168. See id. § 1350.
169. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 400. The Antideficiency Act also requires apportionment of
appropriations “available for obligation for a definite period” to avoid a deficiency. 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a). This
apparently means that agencies are supposed to plan their spending to avoid running out of money. This
requirement does not seem relevant in the context of permanent appropriations.
170. See Gillian E. Metzger, Taking Appropriations Seriously, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1154 & n.413
(2021).
171. 31 U.S.C. § 3711(a)(1).
172. See Federal Claims Collection Act, Pub. L. No. 89-508, § 4, 80 Stat. 308, 309 (1966) (“Nothing in this
Act shall increase or diminish the existing authority of the head of an agency to litigate claims, or diminish his
[sic] existing authority to settle, compromise, or close claims.”); see also Herrine, supra note 1, at 379 & n.290
(collecting additional authorities); Mark, supra note 52, at 15 & n.97 (collecting additional authorities).
173. See Jackson & Mark, supra note 54 (“The fourth challenge confronting the proponents of plenary
compromise authority stems from the Education Department’s own regulations”).
174. 34 C.F.R. § 30.70(a)(1) (2021). The quoted provision has a single exception relating to certain claims
arising from improper spending by “a recipient of a grant or cooperative agreement.” See id. §§ 30.70(a)(1),
(b).
175. Id. § 30.70(e)(1).
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“[f]ederal agencies shall aggressively collect all debts” arising out of their activity176
and authorize compromise only on limited bases.177
The CLM Letter argues that these regulatory provisions do not interfere with
jubilee,178 but it is not clear that the authors’ arguments would carry the day given
the regulations’ apparently clear language. Herrine observes that even if the
regulations cabin authority to “compromise” claims under § 1082(a)(6), they do not
speak to authority to “modify” under § 1082(a)(4)179 (or, it would seem, to “waive”
or “release” claims under § 1082(a)(6)). This argument could well prevail, especially
given that the canon against surplusage suggests that the grants of power to
“compromise,” “waive,” “release,” and “modify” each is given a distinct,
nonidentical scope.180 But absent a persuasive explanation of why strict standards
are appropriate for compromise authority and not for a waiver, release, or
modification authority, some might not find the distinction convincing.181
However, even if the regulations do forbid executive jubilee, the Department can
amend them, as both Herrine182 and Jackson and Mark183 point out. The Department
might have to go through a notice-and-comment rulemaking process to do so,184 but
if the Secretary were committed to jubilee, the need for rulemaking would probably
only delay adoption of the policy, not prevent it.
III. JUBILEE AUTHORITY OVER DIRECT LOANS: EXISTING

INTERPRETATIONS
As just discussed, critics of jubilee authority have focused on arguing that
authority to “waive . . . or release any . . . claim” does not include jubilee power. But
the more serious question of HEA interpretation seems to be whether jubilee power
176. See 31 C.F.R. § 901.1 (2021).
177. The permissible bases relate to the debtor’s ability to pay and the government’s ability and cost to
collect. See id. § 902.2(a)(1)–(4) (2021). If the Department’s regulations obligate it to follow the FCCS, that
obligation seems to be a significant hurdle, even though it might be argued that jubilee is compatible with the
FCCS because one or more of these bases apply to most or all federal held student loans. See CLM Letter,
supra note 3, at 5–6.
178. The CLM Letter argues that: (1) reading the regulations to limit compromise authority is contrary to
their background and purpose; (2) the regulations actually contradict the FCCS, so compliance with the FCCS
must not be required; (3) the FCCS do not apply on their own terms because the Secretary enjoys independent
settlement authority; (4) the regulations do not bind the Secretary to follow FCCS because their language is
precatory and no regulations are needed to implement the Secretary’s relinquishment authority; and (5) the
FCCS themselves may in fact authorize jubilee. See CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 5–6.
179. Herrine¸ supra note 1, at 383.
180. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 174–79.
181. Herrine also argues that the regulations apply only to claims on defaulted loans, appealing to the
generally accepted meaning of “collections” in debt enforcement. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 383. It is not
clear from the face of the regulations that they are limited to “collections” in that sense, however.
182. See id. at 386; see also id. at 383–84 (arguing that FCCS do not restrict the Attorney General’s plenary
authority to compromise or cancel debts, so that that officer could order jubilee).
183. See Jackson & Mark, supra note 54 (recommending that executive loan forgiveness be addressed
through “through the rulemaking process,” which could “clarify the extent to which the Secretary intends to be
governed by the requirements of the FCCA going forward.”).
184. See id. (addressing jubilee “through the rulemaking process” could “clarify the extent to which the
Secretary intends to be governed by the requirements of the FCCA going forward.”).
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extends to DLP loans. As noted,185 the simplest argument in favor of this proposition
would be that relinquishment power, or the opportunity to benefit from
relinquishment power, is part of the “terms, conditions, or benefits” of FFELP loans.
In some ways, the inquiry into whether relinquishment power covers the DLP is
a mirror image of the inquiry into whether jubilee power exists, covered in Part II.
As shown there, the conventional wisdom is that jubilee power does not exist, but the
text of the statute suggests that it does. By contrast, the conventional wisdom is that
relinquishment power does extend to the DLP, but the textual support for this
proposition is less strong (although the conventional wisdom here is probably right
in the end).
Perhaps because no one seems to have questioned the application of the
Secretary’s powers over the FFEL program under Part B of Higher Education Act
Title IV to direct loans issued Part D of Title IV, neither Jackson and Mark nor the
OGC Memo spend much time on the issue. Jackson and Mark do not appear to
address it at all.186 The OGC Memo seems to contradict itself on the matter. At one
point, it expresses doubt that cancellation authority is a “term, condition, or benefit”
of FFELP loans;187 at another, it asserts that “[t]he Secretary’s general powers in 20
U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) also apply to the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program
under Part D of Title IV.” 188
This next Part surveys how courts and the Department have interpreted the parity
provisions to date. The Department has been consistent in its position that the parity
provisions carry its FFEL Program powers over to the Direct Loan Program. The
courts have for the most part gone along with this interpretation, which does not seem
to have been challenged. This near-uniform body of precedent certainly boosts the
argument that jubilee is lawful, but it is not as persuasive as it could be, because it
appears that neither the Department nor the courts have explained their conclusions.
A. Department Interpretations
Agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they administer are probably becoming
less important to federal courts, keeping in line with the overall turn toward textualist
interpretation.189 Nevertheless, the Department’s view of whether its statutory
authorities relating to FFELP loans carry over to DLP loans merits discussion, both
because jubilee proponents have mentioned it190 and because courts might find the
185. See discussion supra Part I.
186. Mark’s individually-authored paper does argue briefly that it is “possible that the HEA does not provide
the Department of Education with the same authority over Direct Loans” that it possesses over FFELP loans.
Mark, supra note 52, at 16.
187. OGC Memo, supra note 52, at 4 n.3 (asserting that conclusion that relinquishment authority applies to
DLP loans through parity provision is “debatable because the Secretary’s general power to compromise or
waive claims under the FFEL program is neither a term nor a condition not a benefit of FFEL program loans.”).
188. Id. at 3 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1087a(b)(2)).
189. See discussion supra Part II.D.
190. See CLM Letter, supra note 3, at 3 & n.5; Herrine, supra note 1, at 370–71, 370 n.264. Herrine also
appeals to Congress’s overall purpose in ending FFELP lending and replacing it with direct lending to argue
that that body probably did not confer less authority to settle or waive DLP claims than to settle or waive FFELP
claims. Id. at 371 n.265. Especially in combination with the lack of any apparent reason for such a selective
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Department’s interpretation persuasive. It seems that the Department consistently
has treated its relinquishment authority as applicable to the Direct Loan program
through the parity provisions, although it has not always stated the point directly. It
does not appear, however, that the Department has given a reasoned explanation for
why the parity provisions import compromise authority into the Direct Loan
Program.
In 2016, the Department stated explicitly that U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6), from Part B,
is “applicable to Direct Loan claims by virtue of” U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(1).191
Separately, as Herrine has pointed out, the Department stated in the course of
proposing rules governing collections in the Direct Loan Program, “section 432(a) of
the HEA [20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)] authorizes the Secretary to enforce or compromise a
claim under the FFEL program; section 451(b) [20 U.S.C. § 1087a(b)] provides that
Direct Loans are made under the same terms and conditions as FFEL Loans.”192 This
quotation further suggests that the Department’s position has been that Part B
compromise power carries over to direct loans.
The collection regulations themselves reinforce this view. In those regulations,
the Department asserts the authority to “compromise a debt in any amount . . . if the
debt arises under . . . the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program.”193 As
authority for this provision, the Department cites U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(5) and (6), as
well as § 1087a.194 Because U.S.C. § 1087a is the only provision of Part D cited, and
because it does not in itself authorize loan compromise, the citation seems to assert
that U.S.C. § 1087a(b)(2) incorporates the settlement authority of §§ 1082(a)(5) and
(a)(6) by reference.195
As the CLM Letter points out, the Department has relied on the parity provisions
to import specific grounds for discharge from the FFELP to the Direct Loan
Program.196 Part B of the HEA, which governs the FFELP, expressly provides for
discharge for death,197 total and permanent disability,198 school closure,199 false

restriction, Herrine’s argument seems persuasive. But textualist courts might be reluctant to resolve the question
on the basis of such a broad legislative purpose.
191. See Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926, 75,930 (Nov. 1, 2016). The
Department miscited 20 U.S.C. § 1087e as the nonexistent “20 U.S.C. 1078e(a)(1).” Id. The quoted statement
was part of the Department’s explanation of its rules on collection from schools when a student loan borrower
has a defense to repayment. Id. at 75, 929-30.
192. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 370–71; Student Assistance General Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 39,330,
39,368 (June 16, 2016).
193. 34 C.F.R. § 30.70(e)(1) (2021).
194. See id. § 30.70 (discussing statutory authority).
195. The regulations also cite former U.S.C. § 1221e-3(a)(1) as a source of authority. This provision
conferred on the Secretary the general power to “make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and
regulations governing the manner of operation, and governing the applicable programs administered by the
agency of which he [sic] is head.” 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3(a)(1) (1993). Congress amended the provision in 1994,
but the same general grant of authority to regulate is now found in 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3 (which now has no
subdivisions). See 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3, Amendment Notes. Thus, it appears that the Department did not rely
exclusively on powers carried over from Part B to promulgate the collection regulations.
196. See CLM Letter¸ supra note 3, at 3 & n.6.
197. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a)(1).
198. Id.
199. Id. § 1087(c)(1).
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certification of borrower eligibility,200 and refunds due to a lender but not paid by the
borrower’s institution.201 Part D of the HEA, governing the Direct Loan Program,
contains no analogous provisions. Nevertheless, the Department adopted regulations
for the Direct Loan Program that provide for discharge in all these instances. In doing
so, it cited 20 U.S.C. § 1087a et seq. for authority.202 U.S.C. § 1087a is the first § of
Part D, so § 1087a et seq. appears to refer to Part D. Given that Part D does not in so
many words provide for the discharges in question, it seems that the Department
relied on the parity provisions of Part D for authority.
The same appears to hold for the Department’s policy on consent to discharge
student loans in bankruptcy. In discussing its policies in this area, the Department
stated that it “follows the same . . . analysis” for direct loans as for FFELP loans.203
Given the absence of settlement rules in Part D, the Department presumably relies on
the parity provisions here as well.
The Department’s view that FFELP settlement authority carries over to direct
loans shows up in Delegation EA/EN/68, which delegates to the Chief Business
Operations Officer, Business Operations, and Federal Student Aid, the authority to
“enforce, compromise, waive, and write off the collection of claims of the
Department against individuals who have current student loans . . . or grant
overpayments held by the Department.”204 It does so under “those provisions of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 that authorize the collection and compromise, waiver,
and write-off” of Department claims arising out of the obligation to repay student
loans, presumably referring to the relinquishment provision. 205 The delegation does
not exclude direct loans and presumably includes them, given the unqualified
language of the delegation and the importance of direct loans. Thus, the Department
again seems to assert that relinquishment authority applies to direct loans.
As noted, agency interpretations may be persuasive even if they are not entitled
to deference.206 Here, however, the Department has not given a reasoned explanation
of its views of the parity provisions, so a court might not give the Department’s
interpretation much weight.207

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.212 (2021). The provisions also cite 20 U.S.C. § 1070g as a source of authority,
but 1070g does no more than define certain terms. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070g. It does not on its face authorize any
action.
203. Memorandum from Lynn Mahaffie, Deputy Asst. Sec’y for the Off. of Postsecondary Educ., U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Undue Hardship Discharge of Title IV Loans in Bankruptcy Adversary Proceedings (July 7,
2015), https://fsapartners.ed.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/dpcletters/GEN1513.pdf.
204. Delegation of Authority – Federal Student Aid (FSA), Collection and Compromise of Claims Against
Individuals Under the Federal Student Aid (FSA) Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Nov. 9, 2009),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/or/delegations/fsa.html.
205. Id. at 1.
206. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
207. See discussion infra Part II.D.
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B. Judicial Interpretations
On at least three occasions, courts have affirmed that the Department’s
compromise power under Part B of Title IV of the Higher Education Act, specifically
U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6), applies to direct loans. However, none of the opinions explains
the basis for this interpretation.
In Weingarten v. DeVos,208 the court held that the Department had unreviewable
discretion, deriving from U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6), to forgive or not to forgive direct loans.
The court stated: “[t]he Department has ‘what is known as Compromise and
Settlement Authority, which allows [it] to compromise or waive any title or claim.’
This authority covers Federal Family Education Loans and Direct Loans alike.209
The plaintiffs argued that the Department should have exercised its discretion to
forgive direct loans210 because of loan servicer misconduct.211 The court found that
U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) governed the compromise of direct loans and conferred on the
Department unreviewable discretion to exercise or not exercise this power.212
In Vara v. DeVos,213 the court noted that the Department had canceled the direct
loans of a student who had filed a borrower defense application.214 The court
observed that the Department did not contend that it had “discharged” the borrower’s
loans through the borrower defense process, “suggesting” that Department acted
under its U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) authority.215
In McCain v. United States,216 the Court of Federal Claims treated the
Department’s settlement authority under U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) as applicable to a direct
loan. The borrower in that case had a Federal Direct Consolidation Loan,217 a loan
made under the Direct Loan Program.218 The borrower argued that the government
had offered to accept a particular amount in full satisfaction of the debt and that she
had accepted.219 In response, the government did not argue that the Secretary lacked
authority to settle direct loans. Instead, it contended that no contract existed because
the servicer employee who made the offer acted outside the scope of delegated
authority.220 In the course of doing so, the government affirmatively argued that the

208. 468 F. Supp. 3d 322, 338 (D.D.C. 2020).
209. Id. at 328. As support, the court cited the complaint, which asserted that the Department’s power under
U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) applies to direct loans through U.S.C. § 1087a(b)(2). Id. (quoting pages 91–92 of plaintiff’s
complaint).
210. See Complaint at 295, Weingarten v. DeVos, 468 F. Supp. 3d 322 (D.D.C. 2020) (No. 02-056)
(asserting that plaintiff took out direct loans to fund her education).
211. Weingarten, 468 F. Supp. 3d at 331–32.
212. Id. at 338.
213. No. 19-12175-LTS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112296, at *1 (D. Mass. June 25, 2020).
214. The opinion does not specify that the borrower had direct loans, but the Department’s filings do
establish that. See id at *41.
215. Id. at *44 n.11.
216. No. 10-264C, 2011 U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims LEXIS 1107, at *1, *5 (Fed. Cl. June 17, 2011).
217. Id.
218. Id. at *5 n.6; see 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(2)(C).
219. McCain v. United States, No. 19-12175-LTS, 2011 U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims LEXIS 1107, at *15 (D. Mass
June 25, 2020).
220. Id. at *20–*25.
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Secretary and authorized delegates have the power to compromise direct loans.221
The court accepted this apparently undisputed framing, writing:
[A]ny offer to compromise and settle a student loan debt must be
authorized and approved by the Secretary of Education, or his
authorized delegates, in accordance with sections 432(a) and 468 of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 [20 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a) & 1087hh], which
authorize the Secretary of Education to collect, write-off, and
compromise claims of the [Department of Education] against
individuals arising from their obligation to repay current or defaulted
student loans held by the [Department of Education].222
The court ultimately agreed with the government that there was no contract
because the servicer employee acted outside the scope of delegated authority.223
Student loan servicers are commonly sued for violating state consumer
protection statutes, and they commonly defend by arguing that federal law preempts
the state statute at issue.224 A number of courts have stated in this context that the
parity provisions make Part B statutory or regulatory provisions governing servicers
applicable to servicing of direct loans.
For example, in the recent case of Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Education
Corp.,225 the Eleventh Circuit observed in the course of discussing the FFELP and
Direct Loan programs together, “[t]he HEA also imposes obligations on student loan
lenders and loan servicers,”226 citing the parity provisions.227 It went on to discuss
various disclosure requirements that U.S.C. § 1083 (Part B) imposes on servicers,
apparently treating them as equally applicable to direct loans.228 The implication is
that FFELP disclosure requirements apply to direct loans through the parity
provisions. Lawson-Ross followed a Seventh Circuit decision from the preceding
year that likewise treated the disclosure requirements of U.S.C. § 1083 as applicable
to direct loan servicers through the parity provisions.229
221. The government argued that “Sections 432(a) [20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)] and 468 [20 U.S.C. § 1087hh] of
the Higher Education Act of 1965 authorize the Secretary to collect, write-off, and compromise claims of the
Department of Education (“DoE”) against individuals arising from their obligation to repay current or defaulted
student loans held by the DoE.” Defendant’s Supplemental Authority in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, in
Part, and Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, McCain v. United States, 2011 U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims
LEXIS 1107 (June 17, 2011) (No. 10-264C). Given that the only loan at issue in the case was a direct loan, the
government was necessarily asserting the power to compromise direct loans under the cited authorities.
222. McCain, 2011 U.S. Ct. Fed. Claims LEXIS 1107, at *19–*20.
223. Id. at *23–*25.
224. See Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater, The Sovereign in Commerce, 73 STAN. L. REV.
1101, 1105, 1114 (2021) (discussing consumer-protection litigation against student loan servicers and servicers’
preemption defenses).
225. 955 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2020).
226. Id. at 912. Although the court discussed both the FFELP and DLP in its opinion, it appears that none
of the loans at issue in Lawson-Ross were made under the DLP. Id. at 913–14.
227. See id. at 912 n.2.
228. See id.
229. See Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., 928 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2019) (describing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1083 disclosure requirements as applicable to “servicers” generally immediately after noting that, under 20
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District courts have reached similar results. In Student Loan Servicing Alliance
v. District of Columbia,230 a case involving the District of Columbia’s authority to
impose a local licensing regime on federal student loan servicers, the court cited
U.S.C. §§ 1082, 1087a, and 1087e together in support of the proposition that “[t]he
HEA and its implementing regulations govern certain procedures that loan servicers
must follow and standards they must meet in servicing federal student loans.”231 In
a pair of cases concerning preemption of state consumer protections against harassing
servicer conduct, Hunt v. Sallie Mae, Inc.232 and Weber v. Great Lakes Education
Loan Services,233 courts held that regulations governing the conduct of FFELP
servicers applied equally to direct loan servicers.234 In both cases, the court cited the
parity provisions for this proposition.235
The parity provisions have on occasion been interpreted even more aggressively.
In Chae v. SLM Corp.,236 the Ninth Circuit held that by enacting U.S.C. §
1087e(a)(1), “Congress created a policy of inter-program uniformity . . . . Congress’s
instructions to the DOE on how to implement the student-loan statutes carry this
unmistakable command: Establish a set of rules that will apply across the board.”237
The court found that this congressional policy of uniformity is so powerful that, far
beyond simply making FFELP rules applicable to the Direct Loan Program, it
actually preempts the application of state consumer protection laws to servicing of
FFELP loans.238 Other courts have found that state-law consumer protection claims
are not preempted without questioning application of the uniformity principle across
federal student loan programs.239 A purely textualist court might not be persuaded
that relinquishment authority extends to direct loans based on such a high-level
appeal to legislative purpose, however.
By way of contrary authority, apparently only one case suggests that the
Department’s Part B powers do not carry over to direct loans. In Pennsylvania
Higher Education Assistance Authority v. Perez, the court cast doubt on whether the
U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(1), direct loans have the same terms, conditions, and benefits as FFELP loans). The named
plaintiff in Nelson, a putative class action, apparently had only FFELP loans. See id. at 641 (referring to
plaintiff’s “federally insured loans”). It is not clear from the opinion whether the putative class included
members with DLP loans.
230. 351 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D.D.C. 2018).
231. Id. at 39 (internal citations omitted).
232. No. 6:13-cv-00500-AA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23825, at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 23, 2014).
233. 13-cv-00291-wmc, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106266, at *1 (W.D. Wis. July 30, 2013).
234. See Hunt, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23825, at *5; Weber, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106266, at *10
(“Eventually, Congress ordered that these same regulations [Part 682.411] would govern third-party collections
for the Federal Direct Program . . . .”). The applicability of Part 682.411 to direct loans was undisputed in Hunt,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23825, at *5.
235. See Hunt, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23825, at *5; Weber, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106266, at *10.
236. 593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010).
237. Id. at 945.
238. Id. (“Permitting varying state law challenges across the country, with state law standards that may
differ and impede uniformity, will almost certainly be harmful to the FFELP”).
239. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 292-94 (3d Cir. 2020); Lawson-Ross v. Great
Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 955 F.3d 908, 919 (11th Cir. 2020); Nelson v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 928
F.3d 639, 651 (7th Cir. 2019). For its part, the Department has embraced the logic of Chae. See Federal
Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal
Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,621 (Mar. 12, 2018).
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Secretary’s “general powers” to operate the FFEL program, conferred under U.S.C.
§ 1082(a), apply to direct loans.240 In that case, the court considered whether the
consent-to-suit provision of U.S.C. § 1082(a)(2), rather than the broader waiver of
sovereign immunity under the Administrative Procedure Act, applied to a servicer’s
lawsuit against the Department.241 The court observed that the Secretary had
contracted with the servicer under Part D, and that it “ha[d] not found . . . language
incorporating into Part D the Secretary’s ‘general powers,’ including the consent-tosuit language of section 1082, from Part B.”242 The court did not squarely hold
U.S.C. § 1082 inapplicable, however, and supplied an alternative basis for its
decision.243 It subsequently vacated the decision on other grounds.244
Thus, the prevailing view among judges appears to be the same as that at the
Department: the parity provisions carry the Secretary’s powers relating to the FFEL
Program over to the Direct Loan Program. Indeed, treatise authors take the same
view.245 But, like the Department, the courts have not explained exactly how the
parity provisions accomplish this transfer.

IV. JUBILEE AUTHORITY OVER DIRECT LOANS: TEXTUAL
ANALYSIS
As just discussed, it appears that neither the Department nor any court has given
a reasoned argument explaining what attributes of the FFEL Program are “terms,
conditions, or benefits” of FFELP loans and therefore applicable to direct loans
through the parity provisions. This Part presumes that textualist courts are likely to
demand such an account and addresses arguments that relinquishment authority, or
the possibility of benefiting from such authority, is or is not part of the “terms,
conditions, and benefits” of FFELP loans.
In addition to the language and structure of the statute and dictionary definitions,
this Part uses judicial decisions and the Department’s regulations as a form of
persuasive authority. It cites them as examples of how certain users of legal English
of (presumably) at least ordinary proficiency have understood the relevant words and
phrases, and no more. For example, the Article does not assert that the federal courts
would defer to Department interpretations of the HEA for any reason other than those
interpretations’ persuasiveness.246

240. 416 F. Supp. 3d 75, 96 (D. Conn. 2019).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 96–97. The court found that even if U.S.C. § 1082(a)(2) applied, it permitted the declaratory
relief the plaintiff sought as to “the only issue in this case.”
244. See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Perez. 457 F. Supp. 3d 75, 90 (D. Conn. 2020) (finding that
APA waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply because plaintiffs did not state a claim).
245. See, e.g., 1A CONSUMER CREDIT LAW MANUAL § 12.06 n.2 (2020) (suggesting that parity provision
authorizes Secretary to adopt closed-school discharge rules for direct loans despite absence of express
authorization in Part D to do so); 1A DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 12.06 n.1 (2021) (same).
246. See, e.g., Cnty. of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020) (explaining that, even
where the courts do not defer to agency interpretation under Chevron doctrine, “we often pay particular attention
to an agency’s views in light of the agency’s expertise in a given area, its knowledge gained through practical
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By way of preview, the leading arguments Part IV puts forth for the proposition
that relinquishment authority extends to the DLP are as follows. First, the possibility
of enjoying loan forgiveness because of the Secretary’s exercise of relinquishment
authority is a “benefit” of FFELP loans under the ordinary dictionary meaning of
“benefit;” the Act calls loan forgiveness a “benefit” of FFELP loans 247 and (2) the
Secretary’s relinquishment authority is part of the “terms and conditions,” or is a
“term,” of FFELP loan contracts; the Act calls the Secretary’s power to adjust
payments part of the “terms and conditions” of Title IV loans and calls the Secretary’s
power to waive repayment under certain Title IV agreements a “term” of those
agreements.248
Key additional support for the proposition that relinquishment authority is part
of the “terms and conditions” or is a “term” of FFELP loan contracts comes from the
facts that the possibility of forgiveness was written into FFELP promissory notes as
well as that the “terms” of contracts include, as Corbin put it, all “rules of law
affecting the operation of the language used.”249
Other potential arguments that relinquishment authority applies to DLP loans are
that nonexercise of the authority is a “condition” of the borrower’s duty to repay250
and that relinquishment authority is part of the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of a
FFELP loan by virtue of being part of the terms, conditions, and benefits of the FFEL
Program, even if relinquishment authority is not part of FFELP loan contracts.251
Less authority speaks to these possibilities, so this Article discusses them more
briefly.
Finally, the statutory structure also supports the proposition that relinquishment
authority carries over to the FFEL Program.252 Apart from the parity provisions, the
DLP portion of the HEA explicitly grants the Secretary few powers relative to what
the portions covering the FFEL and Perkins portions grant. It stands to reason that
the parity provisions close the gap by extending the Secretary’s FFELP powers to the
DLP.
There is room for doubt. The Act does not explicitly provide that relinquishment
authority, per se, is part of the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of FFELP loans, and
the Department apparently has never said as much. The HEA does not define “terms,
conditions, and benefits,” “terms and conditions,” “terms,” “conditions,” or
“benefits,” and it seems to use various phrases interchangeably to refer to the
elements of student loans, making an unambiguous reading hard to pin down. There
is room to argue that only completed loan forgiveness, and not the mere possibility
of forgiveness, is actually a “benefit,” or that “benefit” is used in some specialized
sense that excludes jubilee. There is also room to argue that the Department’s
relinquishment authority, a statute-created attribute of a party rather than an
experience, and its familiarity with the interpretive demands of administrative need” (internal citations
omitted)).
247. See discussion infra Part V.B.
248. See discussion infra Parts V.C. –V.D.
249. 8 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 30.6.
250. See discussion infra Part V.E.
251. See discussion infra Part V.F.
252. See discussion infra Part V.G.
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agreement-created attribute of a deal, is not part of the “terms and conditions” of
FFELP loan contracts.
Nevertheless, on balance, the case that relinquishment authority does extend to
the DLP appears to be the stronger one. This is not least because the HEA itself
seems to provide little affirmative reason to find that the Secretary enjoys vastly
greater authority over FFELP loans that end up in the federal government’s hands
than over loans the federal government made in the first place.
Before diving into the statute, a word on legislative history is in order. Disdain
for legislative history is a hallmark of textualist statutory interpretation,253 and the
legislative history of U.S.C. §§ 1087a(b)(2) and 1087e(a)(1) seems unilluminating in
any event. It appears that the only discussion of the provisions in the legislative
history is in the House report on the budget bill that contained them. It simply
summarizes the statutory text, explaining, “[e]ach of these direct loans would have,
unless otherwise specified, the terms, conditions, benefits and amounts of its
corresponding guaranteed loan under the Federal Family Education Loan
program.”254
The statutory phrase “terms, conditions, and benefits” may consist of one, two,
or three elements. The single-element interpretation would be that “terms,
conditions, and benefits” is a set phrase with a distinct meaning.255 Part IV.A
addresses this possibility.
The two-element interpretation would be “terms, conditions, and benefits”
consists of “terms and conditions” on the one hand and “benefits” on the other. Part
IV.B discusses “benefits” and Part IV.C addresses terms and conditions. The threeelement interpretation would be that each of “terms,” “conditions,” and “benefits”
has a distinct meaning. Parts IV.D and IV.E address “terms” and “conditions” as
discrete items. Part IV.F considers the possibility that relinquishment authority might
be part of the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of the FFELP program, even if not of
FFELP loan contracts. Part IV.G addresses statutory structure and the scope of
applicability of “same terms, conditions, and benefits.”
A. “Terms, Conditions, and Benefits” as a Phrase
A definition of “terms, conditions, and benefits” as a discrete phrase seems
elusive, so a one-element interpretation of the phrase seems unlikely: to find the
meaning of the whole, we must look to the meanings of the constituent parts. The
only uses of “terms, conditions, and benefits” in the statutory text of the U.S. Code

253. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 369–91 (arguing against “[t]he false notion that committee
reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in statutory construction”).
254. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–66, 107 Stat 312 (1993).
255. Courts have recognized, for example, that the phrase “educational benefit” in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)
has a meaning distinct from “a benefit that is educational in nature,” as one might imagine from interpreting the
two words independently. See McDaniel v. Navient Sols. LLC (In re McDaniel), 973 F.3d 1083, 1097 (10th
Cir. 2020); see also Jason Iuliano, Student Loan Bankruptcy and the Meaning of Educational Benefit, 93 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 277, 280 (2019) (suggesting the distinction between these two meanings).
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appear to be in the student loan provisions, which do not define the phrase.256
“Terms, conditions, and benefits” is not used in the FFELP regulations, and the
research for this paper has turned up no dictionary definition of the phrase as such.
The phrase does show up frequently in judicial decisions257 and other legal
sources.258 Setting aside its common use in “terms, conditions, and benefits of
employment,”259 it seems to have two relevant meanings. As applied to programs,
“terms, conditions, and benefits” seems to mean the rules of the program.260 As
applied to contracts, the phrase seems to be used to refer to the contract in its
entirety.261 “Terms and conditions” also has both these meanings and is more
256. Search in U.S. Code Service for “terms, conditions, and benefits,” LEXIS, https://plus.lexis.com/search
(search U.S. Code Service, then enter “terms, conditions, and benefits”); Search in U.S. Code Service for “terms,
conditions, or benefits,” LEXIS, https://plus.lexis.com/search (Search U.S. Code Service, then enter “terms,
conditions, or benefits”).
257. A search in the LEXIS Cases database for documents containing “terms, conditions, and benefits” or
“terms, conditions, and benefits” conducted on July 27, 2021 resulted in 1,063 hits. Search in U.S. Code Service
for “terms, conditions, and benefits” LEXIS, https://plus.lexis.com/search (search U.S. Code Service, then enter
“terms, conditions and benefits” and “terms, conditions, or benefits,” then select “Cases” for the content in the
search bar and click search).
258. A search in the LEXIS Secondary Materials database for documents containing “terms, conditions, and
benefits” or “terms, conditions, or benefits” conducted on July 27, 2021 resulted in 253 hits. Search in U.S.
Code Service for “terms, conditions, and benefits,” LEXIS, https://plus.lexis.com/search (search U.S. Code
Service, then enter
“terms, conditions and benefits” and “terms, conditions, or benefits,” then select “Secondary Material” for the
content in the search bar, then search terms, conditions and benefits” and “terms, conditions, or benefits”).
259. The phrase appears most often in employment cases. Title VII forbids discrimination on certain
grounds “with respect to his [sic] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (2021), and courts sometimes ask whether the employer’s actions affected the “terms, conditions, and
benefits” of the plaintiff’s employment. See, e.g., James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th
Cir. 2004) (discrimination); Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 867–68 (4th Cir. 2001) (retaliation).
Employment seems different enough from student loans that discussions in these cases are not particularly
probative. Nor has research turned up helpful discussions of the phrase in other contexts.
260. See Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastic & Allied Workers Int’l Union v. Consol. Container Co. LP, No.
09-2486-CM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101369, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 24, 2010) (“[t]he terms, conditions, and
benefits of the Life Insurance and Health Care Program were negotiated by the parties and are set forth in detail
in Article 21 of the [collective bargaining agreement]”); Semler v. Eastbay, Inc., No. 62-CV-18-6453, 2020
Minn. Dist. LEXIS 108, at *7 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Apr. 6, 2020) (company’s rules for “membership program”
permitted it to “modify, add, or delete any of the membership terms, conditions, or benefits”).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[o]ur
conclusion is that the settlement has not been shown to be in any respect unlawful or improper, and hence its
terms, conditions, and benefits must go forward immediately in their entirety”); Daugherty v. AAA Auto Club
of Mo., No. 4:14CV1507HEA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62586, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 13, 2015) (“[t]he parties
have read this Arbitration Agreement and hereby voluntarily and knowingly agree to and accept all of its terms,
conditions, and benefits”) (quoting agreement); Scott v. Harris Interactive, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 631 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), rev’d on other grounds, 512 F. App’x 25 (2d Cir, 2013) (“[t]he letter making the offer set forth the terms,
conditions, and benefits of plaintiff’s employment”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); In re
Watkins, 210 B.R. 394, 400 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1997) (apparently using “terms, conditions and benefits” to refer
to all legally operative aspects of a contract); Sarchett v. Blue Shield of Cal., 729 P. 2d 267, 271 n.7 (Cal. 1987)
(“‘[i]n the event of a dispute between the Contractholder or a Member and the California Physicians’ Service,
with respect to any of the terms, conditions or benefits of this contract, the dispute shall be settled as follows’”)
(quoting contract’s only provision regarding dispute resolution); Jeffrey v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., No. E056224,
2014 Cal. App. Unpub LEXIS 4757, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. July 3, 2014) (“‘[t]he parties have read this Agreement
and hereby voluntarily and knowingly agree to and accept all of its terms, conditions, and benefits’”) (quoting
contract). At least one case finds a limit on the “terms, conditions, or benefits” of a contract. When the parties
agreed to arbitrate “‘disputes with respect to any of the terms, conditions, or benefits of this agreement,’” and
one party refused to pay an arbitration award in full, the other party’s contention that the first party acted in bad
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commonly used to convey them, so the Article discusses the all-rules and wholecontract interpretations in that context.
B. The Possibility of Loan Cancellation as a “Benefit” of FFELP Loans
The two-element interpretation of “terms, conditions, and benefits” is that the
words refer to “terms and conditions” on the one hand and “benefits” on the other.
The two-element reading finds support in provisions of Part B262 and Title IV.263
More generally, the two-element interpretation distinguishes between “terms and
conditions” and “benefits.”264
This section argues, consistent with the two-element interpretation of “terms,
conditions, and benefits,” that the opportunity to benefit from the Secretary’s
relinquishment authority is probably a “benefit” of FFELP loans. Support for this
view comes from the HEA’s use of “benefit” to describe loan forgiveness in other
contexts, from dictionary definitions of “benefit,” from the broad meaning generally
ascribed to “benefit” in the HEA and regulations, and from how courts use the term
“benefit.” The case is not ironclad, however, because the HEA apparently contains
no specific reference to relinquishment authority itself (or the possibility of its use)
as a “benefit,” and because it is arguable that only completed loan forgiveness, not
the possibility of forgiveness, is a “benefit.”
1. Affirmative Argument
The most straightforward argument that potential loan cancellation under the
relinquishment authority is a “term, condition, or benefit” of FFELP loans is probably
as follows: from the borrower’s perspective, the possibility of cancellation is a
desirable aspect, or advantage, of FFELP loans, and therefore a “benefit” of those
loans.
The HEA’s use of “benefit” supports this contention. In a provision applicable
to FFELP and other federal student loans, Title IV describes “loan forgiveness” as a

faith was not covered by the arbitration clause. See Mansdorf v. Cal. Physicians’ Svc., Inc., 87 Cal. App. 3d
412, 417 (1978).
262. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078-6(a)(4) (“[a] loan that is sold or assigned under paragraph (1) shall . . . be subject
to the same terms and conditions and qualify for the same benefits and privileges as other loans made under this
part.”). This suggests that “terms and conditions” and “benefits and privileges” are distinct categories.
263. See id. § 1087dd(h)(1)(B) (explaining that rehabilitated Perkins loans are “subject to the same terms
and conditions” and “qualify for the same benefits and privileges” as other Perkins loans); see also 34 C.F.R.
§§ 674.53(b)(2), (c)(2) (2021) (for Perkins program, recognizing possibility that “cancellation benefits provided
under this Section” may not be “included in the terms of the borrower’s promissory note”); 1 EXECUTIVE
EMPLOYMENT LAW: PROTECTING EXECUTIVES § 4.03 (showing “terms and conditions” of employment is
distinct from “benefits” received on termination).
264. LEXIS searches performed July 27, 2021 report that over 10,000 federal court opinions have used the
phrase “terms and conditions,” and that over 1,300 Supreme Court opinions have used it. Search phrase “terms
and conditions,” select “Cases” and “Supreme Court.” Natural Language Search “terms and conditions,” LEXIS,
https://plus.lexis.com/search (search “terms and conditions” in the search bar; select “cases”; then “narrow by
court”).
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“loan benefit” for federal student borrowers.265 Title IV also uses the term “benefit”
to describe specific loan cancellation or forgiveness programs available to FFELP
borrowers, including teacher loan forgiveness,266 forgiveness for service in areas of
national need,267 and loan repayment for civil assistance attorneys.268 The HEA also
designates as “benefits” other loan cancellation programs outside the FFELP, such
as public service loan forgiveness (“PSLF”)269 and teacher loan cancellation for DLP
loans.270 FFELP regulations and other federal student loan regulations refer to loan
cancellation or repayment under various targeted programs as a “benefit.”271
Dictionary definitions also support the proposition that the possibility of
relinquishment relief from FFELP loans is a “benefit” of those loans.272 Dictionaries
unanimously define “benefit” in terms of “advantage,”273 and it seems clear that the
possibility of executive forgiveness is an advantage, in the sense of that it puts the
borrower in a “superior position”274 than the position the borrower would occupy
absent the possibility of forgiveness.
Provisions of Title IV use the word “benefits” broadly, consistent with the
dictionary definition of “benefit” as simply “advantage.” 275 For example, the statute
denotes as “benefits,” provisions for no accrual of interest during active military
service,276 rehabilitation of Perkins loans,277 and exit counseling relating to
consolidation loans.

265. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(b)(1)(A)(vii)(II) (requiring that exit counseling address “the effects of consolidation
on a borrower’s underlying loan benefits, including . . . loan forgiveness . . .”); see also § 1087cc-1(a)(15)
(referring to “repayment and forgiveness benefits available to borrowers of loans made under part D [direct
loans]”).
266. See id. §§ 1087e(m)(4), 1078-10.
267. See id. § 1078-11.
268. See id. § 1078-12 (2018).
269. See id. (including PSLF as a benefit in a Section titled “Ineligibility for double benefits”).
270. See id. § 1087j.
271. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 674.53, 674.56(a)(2), 674.57(b)(2), 674.58, 674.60(a)(2) (2021).
272. Use of dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of words is a standard textualist
approach. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 72.
273. Benefit, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
AMERICAN HERITAGE] (“1.a. something that promotes or enhances well-being; an advantage”); Benefit,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) [hereinafter BLACK’S 7TH] (“1. Advantage; privilege”); Benefit,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1998) [hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE] (“2a : Something that promotes well-being: ADVANTAGE”); Benefit, AMERICAN HERITAGE
CONCISE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE CONCISE] (“[a]n advantage”); Benefit,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter BLACK’S 5TH] (“[a]dvantage;” “[b]enefits are
something to advantage of, or profit to, recipient.”); Benefit, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
[hereinafter OED 1989] (“3. a. Advantage, profit, good. (The ordinary sense.)”).
274. Advantage, OED 1989, supra note 273 (“[s]uperior position . . . [t]he position, state, or circumstance
of being in advance or ahead of another, or having the better of him in any respect; superior or better position;
precedence; superiority . . . . “).
275. See § 1092(b)(1)(A)(vii)(IV) (requiring that exit counseling on consolidation loans must advise
borrower that “borrower benefit programs may vary among different lenders.”); 34 C.F.R. § 674.42(b)(2)(iii)(D)
(2021) (Perkins); 34 § 682.604(a)(2)(iv)(D) (FFELP); § 685.304(b)(4) (iv)(D) (Direct).
276. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(o)(4); see also 34 C.F.R. § 685.220(d)(2)(ii) (2021) (Direct Loan Program
regulations).
277. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087dd(h)(1)(D), (h)(2).
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The FFELP regulations likewise embrace a broad view of the “benefits” of
FFELP loans. FFELP regulations designate as “benefits” eligibility for deferment,278
the regaining of eligibility for student financial aid upon making satisfactory
repayment arrangements on defaulted loans,279 “suspension of administrative wage
garnishment while attempting to rehabilitate a defaulted loan,”280 and certain lenderspecific options.281 Direct Loan Program regulations give an expansive definition of
“financial benefit” that includes “refund, reimbursement, indemnification,
restitution, compensatory damages, settlement, debt forgiveness, discharge,
cancellation, [and] compromise.”282
Outside the context of loans issued specifically under federal programs, courts
commonly speak of loan modification283 and forgiveness284 as “benefits.”285 Even
more significantly, at least one decision describes the mere possibility of loan
modification as a “benefit” of the loan. In Bertelsen v. Citimortgage, Inc.,286 the
court described a mortgage borrower’s argument as including the proposition that the
borrower had “the contractual benefit of having Citi consider him for a loan
modification.”287 The court disagreed that the contract provision at issue obligated
Citi to consider a modification, so it “disagree[d] that the identified provision confers
any benefit upon [plaintiff] Bertelsen.”288 Notably, although the notion that plaintiffborrower Bertelsen enjoyed a contractual “benefit” was critical to the court’s
analysis,289 the court did not question that the possibility of a modification would
278. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.405(a)(4) (2021).
279. See id. § 682.200 (2021), (“A borrower may only obtain the benefit of this paragraph with respect to
renewed eligibility once.”); id. § 682.200(b) (2021) (same provision for Direct Loan Program).
280. See id. § 682.405 (2021) (laying out the FFELP); id. § 685.211(f)(11)(iii) (2014) (laying out the Direct
Program).
281. FFELP regulations reference “special loan repayment benefits offered on the loan, including benefits
that are contingent on repayment behavior, and any other special loan repayment benefits for which the borrower
may be eligible that would reduce the amount or length of repayment.” Id. § 682.205(a)(2)(x) (2021); see also
id. § 682.205(a)(2)(xi) (2021) (requiring disclosure of how borrowers can lose and regain a lender-provided
“repayment benefit”).
282. Id. § 685.206(e)(12) (2021); § 685.222(i)(8) (2021).
283. See, e.g., Genrette v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., C.A. No. 19-1664 (MN), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
176179, at *8 (D. Del. Sept. 25, 2020) (“benefit of the loan modification”); Ober v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No.
1:19-CV-01171, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67397, at *8 (M.D. Pa. April 16, 2020) (“they continued to pay their
mortgage and obtained the benefit of a loan modification agreement”).
284. See, e.g., Partl v. Volkswagen, AG, 895 F.3d 597, 604 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018) (describing loan forgiveness
for certain plaintiffs as a “benefit[]” of a settlement agreement); Delk v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 3:17-cv-02769WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134361, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2017) (plaintiff “would have the benefit of
loan forgiveness”); GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1290 (C.I.T. 2008)
(“Commerce cannot presume that the benefit of the loan forgiveness devolved to Starbright”).
285. Use of statutory language in judicial opinions is relevant to determine the “ordinary legal meaning” of
the terms in question. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 73–74 (“when the law is the subject, ordinary
legal meaning is to be expected, which often differs from common meaning.”).
286. CV-16-2-BU-JCL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53869 (D. Mont. Apr. 7, 2017).
287. Id. at *14.
288. Id.
289. Bertelsen’s claim was for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and in the court’s
formulation of the doctrine of good faith, the “initial inquiry” was into “whether the defendant’s conduct
deprived the claimant of a benefit to which the claimant was entitled under the contract.” Id. at *11 (citations
omitted); see also Fabito v. Wachovia Mortg., Inc., No. 11-CV-43-DMS (POR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29222,
at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011) (alleged “benefit” of class-action settlement was entitlement “to have their loan
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have been a “benefit” if plaintiff-borrower Bertelsen had in fact been contractually
entitled to it.
The possibility of a benefit has been recognized as a benefit in the context of
criminal plea bargains, analogous here both because such bargains are commonly
analyzed under contract-law principles290 and because one party to such bargains is
the government. In United States v. Merriweather,291 for example, the defendant
argued that his plea agreement “offered him no benefit, that is, it was a contract
unsupported by consideration.”292 The court rejected this argument, finding that the
Government’s “‘promise to evaluate in good faith whether a defendant’s cooperation
warranted a substantial assistance reduction motion provide[s] sufficient
consideration for his guilty plea.’”293
2. Counterargument
Despite these arguments, a court could conclude that the opportunity for debt
cancellation under relinquishment authority is not a “benefit” of FFELP loans , such
that it would carry over to direct loans. The mentions of “loan forgiveness” in the
HEA may refer only to specifically designated loan forgiveness programs such as
PSLF,294 rather than to cancellation under the Secretary’s general authority. It
appears that most references in the HEA and regulations to loan forgiveness or
cancellation as “benefits” do in fact entail such specific programs.295 By contrast, it
does not appear that any provision of the HEA or regulations explicitly refers to the
Secretary’s relinquishment authority, or the opportunity to benefit from that
authority, as a “benefit.”
Another potential counterargument is that even if loan cancellation is a “benefit,”
the mere possibility of loan cancellation is not. Dictionaries do supply a set of
meanings of “benefit” that supports this argument. For example, the American
Heritage Dictionary gives a definition of “benefit” as “[h]elp; aid.”296 Under these

considered for a loan modification”); Ghafouri v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 50-CIV-2432, 2014 Cal. Super.
LEXIS 13938, at *2–*3 (Super. Ct. Cty. of San Mateo Jan. 21, 2014) (apparently permitting plaintiffs leave to
amend complaint to assert theory that bank’s failure to consider them for a loan modification deprived them of
contractual benefits).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 797 F. App’x 933, 942 (6th Cir. 2019) (“A plea bargain itself is
contractual in nature and ‘subject to contract-law standards.’”) (citations omitted); United States v. SalazarAlanis. 747 F. App’x 982, 983 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“general contract principles apply to plea
agreements”).
291. Case No. 15-cr-40046-JPG-06, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86734 (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2017).
292. Id. at *3.
293. Id. at *8 (citations omitted). Many decisions affirm the validity of plea agreements that leave the
decision whether to seek a downward departure from sentencing based on the defendant’s cooperation with
prosecutors. See United States v. Kilcrease, 665 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
294. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (authorizing Public Service Loan Forgiveness program).
295. Id. §§ 1092(b)(1)(A)(vii)(II), 1087cc-1(a)(15), 1087e(m)(4), 1078-10, 1087e(m)(4), 1078-11,
1087e(m)(4), 1078-12, 1087e(m)(4), 1087e(m)(4), 1087j; 34 C.F.R. § 682.216(c)(12) (2021).
296. Benefit, AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 273 (definition 1b); see also Benefit, AMERICAN HERITAGE
CONCISE, supra note 273 (“help; aid”); Benefit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE, supra note 273 (“useful
aid : HELP”); Benefit, BLACK’S 7TH, supra note 273 (“[p]rofit or gain”); Benefit, OED 1989, supra note 273
(“[p]ecuniary advantage, profit, gain.”).
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definitions, one might argue that forgiveness itself, but not the possibility of
forgiveness, is a “benefit.”297 Further to this argument, in Harden v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A.,298 the court held that an alleged promise to consider an application for a
loan modification did not “confer any benefit upon Plaintiff,” as “it was merely a
willingness to consider Plaintiff’s application.”299
These arguments should not prevail. Although it is analytically possible to say
that loan cancellation is a “benefit” only when it occurs under a targeted program
rather than the Secretary’s relinquishment authority, there is no apparent affirmative
reason to do so. And given that some chance of getting a benefit is better than no
chance of getting a benefit, it seems likely that the possibility of relinquishment
cancellation is a benefit, even if the cancellation never materializes. Nevertheless,
the contentions cannot be completely dismissed.
C. Loan Cancellation as Part of the “Terms and Conditions” of FFELP Loan
Contracts
As noted, the HEA arguably distinguishes between the “benefits” of loans on one
hand and the “terms and conditions” of the loans on the other. This section analyzes
whether the possibility of executive forgiveness is part of the “terms and conditions”
of FFELP loan contracts, addressing “terms and conditions” as a single concept.
Subsequent sections turn to the possibility that “terms” and “conditions” are separate
and discrete items.
The argument that relinquishment power is part of the “terms and conditions” of
FFELP loan contracts draws support from the fact that the HEA calls the Secretary’s
discretion to adjust payments part of the “term and conditions” of some federal
student loans and from the generally broad meaning given “terms and conditions” in
the statute. Moreover, “terms and conditions” commonly refers to the totality of a
contract, including discretionary powers one party enjoys under the contract. And
the Secretary’s relinquishment authority does appear to be written into the
promissory notes used under both the FFELP and DLP.
At the same time, it appears that no statutory provision explicitly calls
relinquishment authority part of the “terms and conditions” of FFELP loans. In
addition, the statute uses other phrases, such as “terms, conditions, benefits, and
privileges” to describe the totality of loan contracts, raising the possibility that
297. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 345 n.7 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing
“discretionary power” of trustees of union’s national pension and welfare trust fund to “determine specific
benefit levels and eligibility requirements” and “to modify the benefit plan”); DeVivo Assoc. v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 797 F. App’x 661, 662 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding “deferred compensation benefit” could be
amended, terminated, modified, or altered at employer’s discretion); Center v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
895 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2018) (under Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, “The Secretary has the
sole discretionary power to determine in the first instance whether to make an award of . . . benefits in a
particular case”) (citations omitted).
298. No. 4:14-cv-1, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55547, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2015); see also Buchna v.
Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV-10-00418-PHX-MHM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149132, at *15–*16 (D. Ariz. Oct.
25, 2010) (where the “lender is under no obligation to modify a contractually agreed upon loan,” such a
modification is not “a benefit that flows from the mortgage agreement.”).
299. Harden, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55547, at *6.
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relinquishment authority could be, say, a “privilege,” rather than a “term, condition,
or benefit” of FFELP loans. Finally, it could be argued that the Secretary’s
relinquishment authority is not part of the “terms and conditions” of the loan, as it
has its origins in the statute and not the loan agreement. As this section explains, the
argument that relinquishment authority is part of the “terms and conditions” of
FFELP loans seems to be the strongest.
1. Affirmative Argument
The HEA does not give a general definition of “terms and conditions” for federal
student loans in general or FFELP loans in particular. It does, however, expressly
provide that one instance of the Secretary’s discretion to adjust payments is part of
the “terms and conditions” of a DLP loan. In U.S.C. § 1087e, titled “Terms and
conditions of loans,”300 the statute provides, “[t]he Secretary may provide, on a caseby-case basis, an alternative repayment plan to a borrower . . . .”301 The statute states
explicitly that the discretionary power of the Secretary to adjust loans is a “term or
condition” of DLP loans.302
Relatedly, the statute refers to the rules governing loan forgiveness as “terms and
conditions.”303 Its exit counseling rules require institutions to brief students on the
“terms and conditions” of “any loan forgiveness or cancellation provision of this
[title].”304 Once it is accepted that the loan forgiveness rules are terms and
conditions, it is no great leap to find that they are terms and conditions of the FFELP
loans to which they apply.
Other uses of “terms and conditions” in Part B of Title IV of the HEA support
the contention that relinquishment authority is among the “terms and conditions” of
FFELP loans. Part B provides several examples of the terms and conditions of
FFELP loans.305 These examples illustrate the breadth with which “terms and
conditions” is used in the HEA, encompassing such diverse matters as repayment

300. Textualist statutory interpretation permits the use of section titles. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
64, at 221–24.
301. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(4); see also 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(b)(3)(v)(C) (2021) (implementing § 1087e(d)(4)
and providing that borrower “may contact the Secretary . . . and obtain the Secretary’s determination as to
whether an adjustment is appropriate”); id. § 685.211(f)(iv)(2) (2021) (borrower’s right to object to
rehabilitation payment amount is part of the “terms and conditions applicable to the required series of
payments”).
302. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(4).
303. Id. § 1092(b)(1)(A)(iv) (requiring institutions to include in exit counseling, “for any loan forgiveness
or cancellation provision of this title, a general description of the terms and conditions under which the borrower
may obtain” relief); § 1092(d)(1) (instructing Secretary to “provide information concerning the specific terms
and conditions under which students may obtain partial or total cancellation . . . .”). The command of
1092(b)(1)(A)(iv) also appears in the FFELP and DLP regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.604(a)(2)(x)(A) (2021)
(FFELP); § 685.304(b)(4)(ix)(A) (DLP); see also § 685.304(a)(3) (requiring entry counseling for certain direct
loans to provide “comprehensive information on the terms and conditions of the loan”).
304. See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(b)(1)(A)(iv).
305. See id. § 1078-3(b)(4); see also id. §§ 1077(a)(2)(B), 1078(j), 1094(h)(1)(C) (using “other terms and
conditions” at the end of a list, suggesting the preceding items are part of the terms and conditions).
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obligations306 and schedules,307 deferments,308 income-driven repayment plans,309
interest rates,310 origination and default fees,311 and the like.
U.S.C. § 1082(a)(3) in particular suggests that “terms and conditions” has a broad
meaning in Title IV. U.S.C. § 1082(a)(3) provides that the Secretary may include in
federal loan insurance contracts “such terms, conditions, and covenants relating to
repayment of principal and payment of interest . . . and relating to such other matters
as the Secretary determines to be necessary to assure that the purposes of this part
will be achieved.”312 Although this provision is not entirely clear, it suggests that
“terms, conditions, and covenants” can extend to any “matters” the Secretary deems
relevant to the purposes of the loan program.
More general sources of ordinary meaning also suggest that relinquishment
authority is part of the “terms and conditions” of FFELP loans. “Terms and
conditions” is commonly used in statutes and judicial decisions to refer to the totality
of a contract.313 In particular, “terms and conditions” can include discretionary
powers of one party to a contract,314 so the fact that exercise of relinquishment power
is discretionary is consistent with its status as part of the “terms and conditions” of a
FFELP loan.
It might be argued that an item must be contained within a contract to be part of
the “term and conditions” of that contract. For example, a private party typically has
discretion not to enforce contract rights. Perhaps we would not ordinarily call that
306. See id. § 1078-3(b)(4)(B).
307. See, e.g., id. §§ 1077(a)(2)(B), 1077(a)(2)(F), 1078-3(b)(4)(D).
308. See id. §§ 1077(a)(2)(C), 1078-3(b)(4)(C)(i).
309. See id. § 1077(a)(2)(H).
310. See id. §§ 1078(j), 1094(h)(1)(C).
311. See id.
312. See id. § 1082(a)(3).
313. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1119(A) (“Every insurance contract shall be construed according to
the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy.”); FLA. STAT. § 627.419(1) (stating the same);
Landrum v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 F. App’x 606, 609 (11th Cir. 2020) (“We must ‘construe the contract as
written’ and interpret it ‘according to the entirety of its terms and conditions.’”) (internal citations omitted);
Saeed v. Kreutz, 606 F. App’x 595, 597 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The whole premise of Saeed’s implied contract claim
is that the EEO Policy established certain terms and conditions of his employment.”); Fowler v. LAC Minerals
(USA), LLC, 694 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2012) (“In order to ascertain the terms and conditions of a contract,
we must examine the contract as a whole”) (citations omitted); Fish v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 455 F. App’x
575, 577 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[Plaintiff] Fish was provided a rental agreement with written terms and conditions
(collectively, ‘the Rental Agreement’)”); Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v. EMC Nat’l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 84 (2d
Cir. 2009) (“Because the agreements have identical terms and conditions, . . . we refer to them collectively as
the ‘Coinsurance Agreements.’”). To be sure, “terms and conditions” sometimes is used to refer to a subset of
a contract, with other provisions referenced separately. See, e.g., FERC v. FirstEnergy Sols., Corp., 945 F.3d
431, 443 (6th Cir. 2019) (discussing “rates, terms, and conditions” of energy contracts). That usage does not
seem relevant here, where no other loan provisions are mentioned.
314. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Atl. Auto. Components, LLC, No. 321172, 2015 Mich. App. LEXIS
1856, at *20 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2015) (“The plain and unambiguous terms and conditions of purchase
gave [plaintiff] the absolute discretion to terminate the purchase order without cause with 14 days’ notice.”
(citing Burkhardt v. Bailey, 680 N.W.2d 453 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)); Powell v. Kramer, G.D. 14-08873, 2015
Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 14830, at *38 (Allegheny Cty. Ct. Common Pleas May 22, 2015) (“terms and
conditions” of employment agreement provided that employer could change benefits programs “in its sole
discretion”); Griffin v. Long Island R.R., No. 96-CV-4673, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19336, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June
5, 1998) (“terms and conditions” of employee’s settlement agreement with employer included “follow-up
substance testing at the discretion of” the employer).
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discretion, which arguably arises from outside any contract, part of the “terms and
conditions” of that party’s contracts. But the discretion here is created by a statute
that governs and empowers one of the contract parties, the federal government.
Contracts in general and government contracts in particular typically incorporate the
relevant statutory background by reference, as the Supreme Court has held.315 Courts
have found this to be the case for student loans in particular.316 Thus, the
Department’s power to compromise would seem to be so incorporated, and therefore
to be part of the “terms and conditions” of the loan.
The contract documents themselves further support the notion that
relinquishment authority is found in the FFELP loan agreement. The possibility of
waiver or modification is written directly into the Department of Education’s master
promissory notes (“MPNs”), which under the HEA are to “use clear, concise, and
simple language to facilitate understanding of loan terms and conditions by
applicants.”317
A complete set of FFELP master promissory notes is not readily available, but
the MPN for FFELP Stafford Loans in effect through July 31, 2011 contains a
“Borrower’s Rights and Responsibilities Statement” that “provides additional
information about the terms and conditions of loans you receive” under the note.318
The statement notes that the loans are “subject to the Higher Education Act of 1965
. . . and applicable U.S. Department of Education regulations (collectively referred to
as the ‘Act’),” and that “any change to the Act applies to loans in accordance with
the effective date of the change.”319 The Statement goes on to provide, “[t]he Act
may provide for certain loan forgiveness or repayment benefits on my loans in
addition to the benefits described in this MPN.”320

315. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 130 (1991) (“Laws which
subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a
part of it, as fully as if they had been expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms”); see also Sarmiento v.
United States, 678 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted) (“the provisions of [existing law]
are regarded as implied terms of the contract”) (construing contract between IRS and taxpayer to compromise
tax liability); Illinois v. Daiwa Special Asset Corp., 337 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted)
(“Statutes are a source of implied contract terms”); McMoran Oil & Gas Co. v. KN Energy, Inc., 942 F.2d 765,
768–69 (10th Cir. 1991) (“terms and conditions” of sale of natural gas included whether the gas was sold in a
regulated or a deregulated setting, i.e., the regulatory background of a contract is part of the “terms and
conditions” of that contract); Doe v. Ronan, 937 N.E.2d 556, 562 (Ohio 2010) (where legislature adopted
detailed statutes regulating employment of school employees, such contracts “must be construed as though the
statutes are incorporated into the contract and become implied terms and conditions of any contract or
contractual right.”); 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:19 (4th ed. 2021) (Unless a contrary intention is
manifested, “valid applicable laws existing at the time of the making of a contract enter into and form a part of
the contract as fully as if expressly incorporated in the contract”) (internal footnotes omitted).
316. See In re Evans, 322 B.R. 429, 435 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2005) (“The terms of the loans are established
by the promissory notes executed by the student loan borrowers as well as federal laws and regulations.”).
317. 20 U.S.C. § 1082(m)(1)(B)(i).
318. FED. FAM. EDUC. LOAN PROGRAM (FFELP), FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAM
(FFELP):
FEDERAL
STAFFORD
Loan
MASTER
PROMISSORY
NOTE
(MPN)
KHEAA,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160322192347/https://www.kheaa.com/pdf/forms/staf_mpn_fill.pdf
[hereinafter 2011 FFELP MPN].
319. Id.
320. Id.
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New loans are no longer being issued under the FFELP, but the Master
Promissory Notes currently used in the Direct Loan Program seem to confirm that
the relinquishment authority is part of DLP loans’ terms and conditions. The MPNs
provide, under the heading “MPN Terms and Conditions,” that “[t]he terms of this
MPN are determined in accordance with the Higher Education Act of 1965” and other
federal laws and regulations, as well as that terms of the loan may be “modified or
waived” by the Department of Education or its servicers, as long as this is
accomplished in writing.321 It also reaffirms the connection between the HEA’s
provisions and the “terms” of the loan, noting that “amendments to the Act may
change the terms of this MPN.”322
2. Counterarguments
The argument that relinquishment authority is not part of the “terms and
conditions” of FFELP loans rests more on gaps in the affirmative case than on
independent contrary evidence. As example of such gaps, Title IV does not explicitly
state that the authorities granted in §§ 1082(a)(4) and 1082(a)(6) are part of the “terms
and conditions” of a FFELP loan, and the single instance where Title IV calls a
discrete payment-adjustment authority part of the “terms and conditions” of a loan—
U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(4), which was cited above—323 is just one provision in a lengthy
statute that contains many references to “terms and conditions.”324
Similarly, although the MPNs refer to modification and waiver, they do not
expressly refer to U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(4) and 1082(a)(6), and the current MPN does
not clearly denote the modification and waiver authority that it does reference as part
321. MPN for Undergraduate Students, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/mpn/subunsub/landing
(last visited Dec. 27, 2021) [hereinafter DLP Subsidized & Unsubsidized MPN]; Master Promissory Note
(MPN): Direct PLUS Loans, William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, FED. STUDENT AID
https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/PLUS_MPN_508-en-us.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2021) [hereinafter
DLP PLUS MPN]. The same provision appears in the MPNs’ “Borrower’s Rights and Responsibilities
Statement,” which “provides additional information about the terms and conditions of the loans.”
322. DLP Subsidized & Unsubsidized MPN, supra note 321; DLP PLUS MPN, supra note 321; see also 34
C.F.R. § 685.201(c)(1) (2021) (stating that for Direct Consolidation Loans, “[t]he application and promissory
note sets forth the terms and conditions”).
323. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(4) (providing in a Section titled “Terms and conditions of loans” that “the
Secretary may provide, on a case-by-case basis, an alternative repayment plan” and shall “design[]” such plans).
On the other hand, U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(4) could weigh against finding that relinquishment authority extends to
jubilee in the first place. Arguably, if the Secretary has relinquishment authority over DLP loans, then the
authorization in U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(4) to craft repayment plans is surplusage. This is not necessarily the case,
however, as the provision also constrains the Secretary, who must “ensure that” repayment plans provided to
borrowers “do not exceed” certain costs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(4). U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(4) thus can be
understood as consistent with plenary relinquishment power: the provision limits that power in the specific
situation of designing personalized IDR plans. Given the clear grant of authority to “waive . . . or release any
. . . claim,” 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6) (2021), it seems unlikely that the surplusage argument would prevail.
324. According to a LEXIS search performed on July 27, 2021, sixteen different Sections of Parts B and D
of Title IV mention “terms and conditions” at least once. LEXIS, https://plus.lexis.com/firsttime (select
“Statutory Codes,” then “United States Code Service – Titles 1 Through 54,” then click: “Title 20. Education,”
then Chapter 28. Higher Education Resources and Student Assistance,” then click: “Student Assistance,” then
check both “Federal Family Education Loan Program” and “William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program.”
Then, enter “terms and conditions” in the search box and click “search.” After, eliminate multiple hits for the
same provision effective at different times by filtering by date).
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of the “terms and conditions.” In any event, a textualist court might discount the
Department’s use of language in an MPN, as discussed above.325
The HEA sometimes uses phrases other than “terms, conditions, and benefits” or
“terms and conditions” to refer to the totality of the student loan relationship. As
previously noted, two provisions refer to “terms and conditions” on the one hand and
“benefits and privileges” on the other.326 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(3), mentioned above,
refers to “terms, conditions, and covenants.”327 Other provisions mention “terms,
limitations, or conditions”328 and “terms and conditions or provisions” of federal
student loans.329 These instances open up the possibility that the opportunity to
receive cancellation under the Secretary’s relinquishment authority might be a
“covenant,” “provision,” “limitation,” or “privilege” of FFELP loans without being
a “term, condition, or benefit.”
Two of these possibilities seem unlikely. Assuming neither party makes any
promises relating to relinquishment authority, as is the case under the current MPNs,
it seems unlikely that the possibility of cancellation, or the authority to cancel, is a
“covenant.”330 As for “provisions,” the Act suggests that the word is a substitute for
“terms and conditions.” In 20 U.S.C. § 1098bb, the Secretary is authorized to “waive
or modify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student financial
assistance programs under title IV of the Act” as needed in connection with war and
national emergency.331 The same section of the Act requires the Secretary to provide
notice of “the terms and conditions to be applied in lieu of such statutory and
regulatory provisions.”332
It does seem possible that the opportunity for relinquishment cancellation could
be a “privilege” rather than a “benefit” of FFELP loans, but the HEA’s consistent
reference to loan cancellation as a “benefit,” rather than a “privilege,”333 cuts against
this interpretation. The argument that nonexercise of relinquishment authority is a
“condition” of the loan could conceivably support the interpretation that nonexercise
is a “limitation” of the loan, but even if that interpretation were accepted, the
possibility of relinquishment cancellation could still be part of the “terms, conditions,
or benefits” of FFELP loans under the other arguments presented here. Moreover,
there is no affirmative indication in the HEA that nonexercise of relinquishment
authority as a “limitation” and not a “condition” of FFELP loans.
The common conclusion of all the counterarguments mentioned so far is that
there is room to argue that relinquishment authority is not part of the “terms and
325. See discussion supra Part III.A.
326. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1078-6(a)(4), 1087dd(h)(1)(B).
327. Id. § 1082(a)(3).
328. See id. § 1078-12(d)(3) (Secretary’s student loan repayments under program for aid to civil legal
assistance attorneys to be made “subject to such terms, limitations, or conditions as may be mutually agreed
upon by the borrower and the Secretary”).
329. See id. §§ 1094(h)(1)(A)(ii), 1094(h)(1)(C)(ii).
330. See, e.g., Covenant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (providing as the only definition of
covenant: “[a] formal agreement or promise, usu. in a contract or deed, to do or not do a particular act; a compact
or stipulation”).
331. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098bb(a)(1).
332. See id. § 1098bb(b)(2).
333. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
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conditions” of FFELP loans. The authority is not mentioned with great specificity as
being among the “terms and conditions,” and it is possible that relinquishment
authority could be something else – a “privilege,” perhaps. But it appears that
nothing in the statute affirmatively indicates that Congress excluded relinquishment
authority from FFELP loan terms and conditions. The case for inclusion, though
imperfect, seems the stronger one based on this evidence.
Two other counterarguments are worth mentioning. The first is that the federal
government’s relinquishment authority cannot be part of the “terms and conditions”
of FFELP loans because the federal government at least initially was not a party to
FFELP loans, which were made by private lenders.334 The government would take
over the loan only upon the happening of an event such as a default.335 However, the
promissory notes seem to answer this objection. The key provision of the FFELP
MPN was the borrower’s promise to “pay to the order of the lender” the amount
disbursed, plus interest and other charges.336 “Lender” in turn was defined as “the
original lender and its successors and assigns, including any subsequent holder of this
MPN.”337
The final counterargument addresses the uses of “terms and conditions” in other
contexts. Although the term is used to refer to discretionary powers of a party, it
typically refers to discretionary powers created by the contract.338 Perhaps this
means that the Secretary’s power to forgive loans is outside the contract “terms and
conditions,” as that power arises from statute, not contract.339 However, this Article’s
research has not identified any authority affirmatively supporting this position, such
as a case addressing whether and when the statutory powers of a governmental party
to a contract are “terms and conditions” of that contract. Insofar as “terms and
conditions” is often used for the totality of the contractual relationship, as noted
above, the phrase would seem to sweep in powers to alter contract duties, no matter
what their source. Finally, some definitions of “term” in the contract context include
the totality of the legal relationship or the laws affecting the agreement, not limited
to items that arise from the agreement itself. The following section takes up this
issue.
In sum, the argument that relinquishment authority is part of the “terms and
conditions” of FFELP loans is strong but not clearly dispositive. In this, it is similar
to the preceding argument, that the opportunity to benefit from relinquishment
authority is a “benefit” of FFELP loans.

334. See John Patrick Hunt, The Development of Federal Student Loan Bankruptcy Policy, 45 J.C. & U.L.
85, 98 (2020) [hereinafter Hunt II].
335. See id.
336. 2011 FFELP MPN, supra note 318, at 1.
337. Id.
338. See discussion accompanying supra note 313.
339. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a)(4), 1082(a)(6).
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D. Loan Cancellation as a “Term” of FFELP Contracts
“Terms” and “conditions,” understood as separate items joined by a conjunction,
might mean something different from the phrase “terms and conditions” taken as a
unit. This section addresses the possibility that relinquishment authority is a “term”
of FFELP loan contracts if the word “term” is taken in isolation.
The HEA provides that the Secretary’s discretionary power to waive repayment
under a type of student is a “term” of the agreement. Moreover, relinquishment
authority appears to meet the definitions of contract “term” offered by Corbin and by
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.340 The UCC’s definition of a contract “term”
requires that the item be part of the agreement, but waiver and modification authority
has been written into FFELP agreements.341 On the other hand, relinquishment
authority arises from the HEA and not from loan contracts, and that might indicate
that the authority is not a contract term.
1. Affirmative Argument
The HEA does not seem to distinguish systematically between “terms” as a
separate concept and “terms” as part of “terms and conditions.” Indeed, the Act
sometimes uses “terms” interchangeably with “terms and conditions.”342 Thus, the
argument above that the possibility of cancellation is part of the “terms and
conditions” of a federal student loan is also an argument that the possibility is part of
the “terms” of the loans in this sense.
There is some indication from the use of the word “term” in the HEA where it
stands alone, suggesting relinquishment authority is a “term” of FFELP agreements.
The HEA refers to the Secretary’s discretionary power to waive certain rights to
recover from borrowers as a “term” of an agreement. U.S.C. § 1078-12 provides that
the Secretary may enter into agreements to provide repayment assistance to civil legal
assistance attorneys.343 U.S.C. § 1078-12(d), titled “Terms of agreement,” requires
that agreements under the provision specify that the Secretary has the right to recover
benefits provided under the agreement under some circumstances (for example, if the
borrower quits a job as a civil legal assistance attorney before the term of the
agreement is up).344 The subsection provides, “the Secretary may waive, in whole in
part, a right of recovery under this subsection if it is shown that recovery would be
contrary to the public interest.”345 This provision is helpful for a student loan jubilee
in that it seems to provide that discretionary power to waive claims, such as those

340. See discussion infra.
341. See discussion infra.
342. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087i-2(b). Under the title “Terms of loans,” this subsection provides that one type
of federal direct consolidation loan “shall have the same terms and conditions” as another type of federal direct
consolidation loan. Id.
343. See id. §§ 1078-12(c), 1078-12(d).
344. See id. § 1078(d)(1)(B).
345. See id. § 1078(d)(1)(D).
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under U.S.C. § 1082(a)(6), is a “term” of a student loan agreement, or at least of a
student-loan-related agreement.346
The FFELP regulations also support the notion that loan contract “terms” include
the relevant aspects of the legal environment surrounding the contract. One element
of the regulations’ definition of “default” is “[t]he failure of a borrower . . . to make
an installment payment when due, or to meet other terms of the promissory note, the
Act, or regulations as applicable.”347 This provision could be read to imply that the
terms of a FFELP loan include the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions, not
just the promises and conditions found in the promissory note.
Outside the specific HEA context, this Article’s research has not turned up a
general definition of a contract “term” in judicial decisions. Courts refer to loan
forgiveness provisions of contracts as “terms” of those contracts without explicitly
defining the word.348
Having surveyed uses of “term” that support the proposition that relinquishment
authority is a “term” but do not define that word, we now turn to definitions to assess
the possibility that “term” has the specialized legal meaning of “contract term.”
Textual interpretation calls for using technical definitions for technical terms.349
Along these lines, Corbin provides, “[t]he terms of a contract are all of its words,
taken individually and also in phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, and the rules
of law affecting the operation of the language used.”350 The statutory provisions
authorizing the Secretary to use relinquishment power are “rules of law,” and they
affect the “operation” of the promissory note’s language requiring repayment in that
they define when that obligation comes due. Thus, Corbin’s formulation suggests
that the legal powers of the Secretary to cancel FFELP loans are “terms” of those
loans.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a “term” of a contract as “that
portion of the legal relations resulting from the promise or set of promises which
relates to a particular matter, whether or not the parties manifest an intention to create
those relations.”351 As described, the Secretary’s power to forgive loans appears to
be an aspect of the “legal relations” between borrower and government. Moreover,
346. On the other hand, the provision may be unhelpful in that it expressly provides that the Secretary has
the power to waive claims to promote the public interest in a single narrow context, potentially suggesting there
is no general power to waive claims on this basis. A counter to this contention is that § 1078-12(d) provides
what a certain type of “written agreement” must “specif[y].” See id. § 1078(d)(1). What this provision implies
for other contexts may be merely that the Secretary need not specify the general waiver power in writing, rather
than that the power does not exist.
347. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.200 (2021); id § 685.102 (2021).
348. See, e.g., Johnson Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Halterman, 867 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir.

2017) (describing a provision for loan forgiveness as a “term” of employee’s
recruitment agreement); Decohen v. Capital One, N.A., 703 F.3d 216, 221 (4th Cir.
2012) (describing a provision “under which a bank agrees to cancel all or part of a
customer’s obligations . . . upon the occurrence of specified events” as a “loan term”
(internal citations omitted)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Schwarzwaelder, 496 F. App’x 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Often the terms of the loan
explicitly contemplate forgiveness.”).
349. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 73–77.
350. 8 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 30.6.
351. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 5 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
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those legal relations “result from the set of promises” contained in the promissory
note. Thus, the forgiveness power would seem to fit the terms of this expansive
definition.
2. Counterarguments
Unsurprisingly, some objections to the theory that relinquishment authority is a
“term” of FFELP loans are similar to objections to the theory that the authority is part
of the “terms and conditions” of the loans. Again, the HEA and regulations do not
explicitly refer to relinquishment authority as a “term.” Again, although judicial
decisions refer to loan forgiveness as a “term,” it does not appear that opinions
commonly describe a discretionary power to release obligations in this way. And
again, these amount to the (partial) absence of evidence rather than evidence of
absence.
As for legal definitions of a contract “term,” the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”) provides an arguably narrower definition than Corbin and the Restatement.
The UCC defines a “term” as “a portion of an agreement that relates to a particular
matter.”352 The UCC explicitly distinguishes the “agreement,”353 or “bargain of the
parties in fact,”354 from the “contract,” the “total legal obligation that results from the
parties’ agreement.”355 At least one dictionary defines “term” as an “element[]” of
an “agreement,”356 although other definitions embrace the more expansive view of a
“term” as part of a contract.357 While Corbin would call relinquishment authority a
“term” because it is a “rule of law that affects the operation of the language used,”—
and the Restatement would probably call it a term because it is part of the legal
relations resulting from the agreement—the UCC would not call relinquishment
authority a “term” unless that authority is part of the “agreement.”
The UCC’s definition may not be that threatening to jubilee authority. As noted,
FFELP loan agreements have expressly provided for the possibility of modification
under the Act,358 so that relinquishment authority could fairly be called part of the
“agreement.”

352. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(40) (AM. L. INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE L. 2021).
353. Id. § 1-201(b)(3) (defining “agreement,” “as distinguished from ‘contract’”);
id. § 1-201(b)(12) (defining “contract,” “as distinguished from ‘agreement’”).
354. Id. § 1-201(b)(3); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“An
agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons.”).
355. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(b)(12) (AM. L. INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L. 2021); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“[T]he word
‘contract’ is commonly and quite properly . . . used to refer to the resulting legal obligations [i.e., resulting from
enforceable promise], or to the entire resulting complex of legal relations.”).
356. See AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 273 (“One of the elements of a proposed

or concluded agreement”).
357. See Term, BLACK’S 7TH, supra note 273 (“A contractual stipulation”); Term, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1996) [hereinafter BLACK’S 6TH] (“[w]ord, phrase, or condition in a contract, instrument,
or agreement which relates to a particular matter”).
358. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1.
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Moreover, some dictionary definitions support the Corbin-Restatement position
that a “term” need not be part of the agreement itself. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary defines “terms” as “provisions that determine the nature and scope of an
agreement.”359 If “provisions” here include any and all legally operative provisions,
then the terms of a FFELP loan would seem to include the Secretary’s relinquishment
authority. On the other hand, “provisions” may be best understood here as
“provisions of the agreement.” The 1990 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines
a “term” as a “[w]ord, phrase, or condition in a contract” rather than as a portion of
an agreement.360
The strongest argument that relinquishment authority is not a “term” of FFELP
loan contracts might be that relinquishment authority, being created by statute, does
not “result[] from” the FFELP loan agreement,361 even though it is referenced in and
arguably part of the agreement. One response to this argument is that there is no loan
to cancel without an agreement, so the existence of cancellation authority in any
individual case depends on the agreement. Another reply is that the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts’ reference to the “legal relations” resulting from the agreement
includes all legally operative aspects of the relationship between the parties that the
agreement creates. This view suggests that the agreement only needs to create the
relationship that contains the terms, not each and every one of the terms themselves.
E. Loan Cancellation as a “Condition” of FFELP Contracts
“Conditions” is used interchangeably with “terms and conditions” in the HEA.362
It is striking just how often dictionaries define “term” as a “condition”363 and vice

359. Term, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE, supra note 273.
360. Term, BLACK’S 6TH, supra note 357.
361. This phrase is taken from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. b. (AM. L. INST. 1981).
362. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078-6(a)(4) (providing in a paragraph titled “Applicability

of general loan conditions” that certain loans are subject to the “same terms and
conditions” as other loans; see also § 1078(k)(4)(B) (providing notice of options for
removing loan from default must include “[t]he relevant fees and conditions
associated with each option”); id. § 1087-1(a)(1) (stating that reason for certain
changes to program is in part “to assure that the limitation on interest payments or
other conditions (or both)” on certain loans “do not impede” fulfillment of the
purposes of Part B).
363. See Term, BLACK’S 6TH, supra note 357 (“Word, phrase, or condition in a contract”); Term, AMERICAN
HERITAGE CONCISE, supra note 273 (“4. Often terms. A stipulation or condition”); Term, AMERICAN
HERITAGE, supra note 273 (“One of the elements of a proposed or concluded agreement; a condition.”); Term,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE, supra note 273, (“[P]rovisions that determine the nature and scope of an
agreement”); Term, OED 1989, supra note 273 (“8 a. pl. Conditions or stipulations limiting what is proposed
to be granted or done.”). The current OED elaborates: (“II. A condition or stipulation; a state or situation . . . .
6. a. A condition under which something may be done, settled, agreed, or granted; a stipulated requirement or
limitation. Usually in plural; also in terms and conditions.”). Term, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE
(2021). As is evident from the foregoing, “term” is often defined as a “stipulation.” Given that the potentially
relevant meanings of “stipulation” seem to be “a formulated term or condition of a contract or agreement” and
“a condition stipulated for,” Stipulation, OED 1989, supra note 273 (referring to definitions “4” and “5”, as the
definition of a “term” as a “stipulation” is not helpful here).
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versa.364 This section focuses on meanings of “conditions” that do not duplicate
meanings of “terms and conditions” or “terms” discussed above.
The Secretary’s decision not to exercise relinquishment authority to cancel loans
could reasonably be termed a “condition” of the borrower’s duty to pay. If the
nonexercise of relinquishment authority is a prerequisite to the borrower’s duty, then
it can be seen as an event that must occur before the borrower’s duty matures.
Although the exercise or nonexercise of relinquishment is within the Secretary’s
authority, that is not a problem for this argument; it appears very unusual to refer to
a party’s decision not to exercise its power to release the other from the contract as a
“condition.”
1. Affirmative Argument
“Condition” is not defined in the HEA, but it appears repeatedly in the Act,
bearing what appears to be a general meaning of “prerequisite.”365 Dictionaries
define “condition” the same way.366
Contract law’s specialized meaning of “condition” is consistent with the
definition of condition as “prerequisite” but is more precise. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts provides that a “condition” in a contract is an event that must
occur in order for performance under the contract to become due.367 “Condition,”
when used in the phrase “condition subsequent,” also can mean an event that
terminates a contractual obligation that has already come due.368

364. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Sometimes [‘condition’]
is used to refer to a term (§ 5) in an agreement that makes an event a condition, or more broadly to refer to any
term in an agreement”); 8 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 30.6 (“Anyone can use the word ‘conditions’ to mean
exactly [the terms] and nothing more.”).
365. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1078(c)(3)(D) (permitting guaranty agencies to put borrowers into forbearance
without borrower consent “under conditions authorized by the Secretary.”); id. § 1078-2(d)(1)(A)(i)
(commencement of repayment obligation is “subject to deferral” when borrower “meets the conditions required
for a deferral”); id. §§ 1098h(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(3)(B) (requiring certain disclosures from borrowers “as
a condition of eligibility” for certain loans and discharges); see also, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 674.9(j) (2021) (regaining
eligibility for certain loans after default requires satisfying “one of the conditions [for eligibility]” in a particular
regulatory provision); id. §§ 682.210(a)(4) (2021), 682.215(f) (2021) (referring to prerequisites as
“conditions”).
366. See Condition, AMERICAN HERITAGE CONCISE, supra note 273 (“A prerequisite.”); Condition,
AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 273 (“One that is indispensable to the appearance or occurrence of another;
prerequisite”); Condition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE, supra note 273 (“[S]omething essential to the
appearance or occurrence of something else: PREREQUISITE”); Condition, OED 1989, supra note 273
(“Something that must exist or be present if something else is to be or take place; that on which anything else
is contingent; a prerequisite.”).
367. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also 8 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 30.7 (“Conditions, for our present purposes, are those facts and events, occurring after the making
of a valid contract, that must exist or occur before there is a right to immediate performance.” (emphasis in
original)).
368. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 230 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (provision “that an obligor’s
matured duty will be extinguished on the occurrence of a specified event” is “sometimes referred to as a
‘condition subsequent.’”). Black’s Law Dictionary embraces both definitions. See Condition, BLACK’S 7TH,
supra note 273 (“A future and uncertain event on which the existence or extent of an obligation or liability
depends; an uncertain act or event that triggers or negates a duty to render a promised performance.”);
Condition, BLACK’S 6TH, supra note 357 (retaining the same definition as BLACK’S 7TH); see also Condition,
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Under these definitions, the Secretary’s nonexercise of relinquishment power
before a due date could be styled as a “condition”: nonexercise is a “prerequisite” to
the duty to pay or an event that must occur before payment comes due. Exercise of
that power after payment is due could be a “condition subsequent” to the duty to pay
in that such exercise would terminate the duty to pay.
2. Counterarguments
It might be argued that it makes a difference that the Secretary—the
personification of one of the parties to a federal direct student loan contract—decides
unilaterally whether the “condition” of nonexercise of relinquishment authority is
fulfilled. Requiring payment “if I want it,” for example, might be different in kind
from requiring payment “if it rains on Wednesday.” However, contract law
recognizes as conditions events that are under the control of a contracting party;
conditions that one party be satisfied with the other’s performance, for example, are
routinely recognized.369
The more serious problem seems to be that apparently no authority expressly
calls one party’s failure to use its power to terminate the contract or waive or release
claims a “condition” of the other party’s duty.370 This is similar to the situation with
“terms and conditions” and “terms,” where no judicial precedent seems to address
whether preexisting discretionary powers are “terms and conditions” or “terms” of a
contract. It seems, however, that opinions use “condition” in a precise sense more
frequently than “terms” or “terms and conditions,” so the absence of authority may
be more telling here.
F. Loan Cancellation as Part of the “Terms, Conditions, and Benefits” of the
FFEL Program
Loans under the FFELP are not just contracts; they are also instances of the
implementation of a government program. Thus, even if relinquishment authority is
not part of the “terms and conditions,” “terms,” or “conditions” of the FFELP loan
contract itself, it might be part of the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of the loan
because it is part of the terms, conditions, and benefits of the program under which
the loan is made. For example, consider a possible judicial finding that
AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 273 (“A provision making the effect of a legal instrument contingent on the
occurrence of an uncertain future event.”); Condition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE, supra note 273
(“[A[ premise upon which the fulfillment of an agreement depends . . . a provision making the effect of a legal
instrument contingent upon an uncertain event; also : the event itself”) (emphasis in original); Condition, OED
1989, supra note 273 (“In a legal instrument, e.g., a will, or contract, a provision on which its legal force or
effect is made to depend.”).
369. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 228 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (providing rules for
interpreting conditions of an obligor); 8 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 31.6 (“[A] contractor can, by the use of clear
and appropriate words, make a duty expressly conditional upon personal satisfaction with the quality of
performance”).
370. Cf. 8 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 30.7 (asserting that although “legal capacity, offer, acceptance,
consideration, and delivery are in some sense conditions precedent” to contractual rights and remedies,
“[n]evertheless, it was never customary to refer to them as ‘conditions precedent.’”).
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relinquishment authority is excluded from the contract terms and conditions, perhaps
because of its statutory origin. In such a case, an argument that relinquishment
authority is part of the terms and conditions of the FFEL Program could be helpful.
1. Affirmative Argument
In most instances, when “terms, conditions, and benefits” and its constituent
parts appear in Title IV, the reference could be to the terms, conditions, and/or
benefits of the contract, the program, or both.371 The use of words in the statute itself
thus does not help decide whether relinquishment authority is a term, condition, or
benefit of FFELP loans by virtue of being a term, condition, or benefit of the FFEL
Program.
More generally, statutes and judicial decisions use the phrase “terms and
conditions” of a program to refer to all the rules governing that program.372 The
“terms and conditions” include rules authorizing the program administrator to use
discretion.373 Sometimes the word “terms” alone instead of the phrase “terms and

371. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.1, IV.C.1, IV.D.1, and IV.E.1 (discussing appearances of “terms,
conditions, and benefits,” “terms and conditions,” “terms,” conditions,” and “benefits” in HEA Title IV).
372. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 575 (1992) (providing for
transfer of certain excess funds “under the terms and conditions of the appropriate program”); Elliott v.
Montgomery, 59 So. 3d 663, 669 (Ala. 2010) (the power to set the “terms and conditions” of a state benefit
program included the power to set “the administrative rules governing the State program”).
373. See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Container Store, Inc., 904 F.3d 70, 86 (1st Cir. 2018) (loyalty program’s
“terms and conditions” provided that seller could, “at [their] discretion,” modify terms of program); James v.
McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2005) (for promotional contest offered by fast-food restaurant,
“A contest participant cannot pick and choose among the terms and conditions of the contest; the rules stand or
fall in their entirety.”); Santich v. GNC Holdings, Inc., No. 17-cv-540 DMS(RBB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
164707, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017) (discussing retailer’s Gold Card loyalty program, saying: “The Terms
and Conditions and the Gold Card permit GNC to modify and eliminate the Program at its discretion, at any
time and without notice.”); Liberchuk v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 99 Civ. 8555, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18267, at *4–*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2000) (“Under the terms and conditions of plaintiff’s health care
plan, . . . defendant is vested with discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe
the terms of the plan”); In re Quinn, 141 B.R. 44, 48 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (“Terms and conditions” of pretrial
intervention program included “discretion of the prosecutor and program director” to require restitution and
community service); In re Ward, No. SB-18-0018-R, 2018 Ariz. LEXIS 176, at *1 (Ariz. May 31, 2018)
(“Terms and conditions” of lawyer’s reinstatement to the bar include lawyer’s entry into agreement that “may,
at the discretion of the Compliance Monitor, include” certain requirements); State v. Parekh, 1 CA-CR 08-0583,
2009 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 358, at *10 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2009) (“Terms and conditions” of
probation included provision that “[a]t the discretion of [the Adult Probation Department],” defendant must
attend certain treatment program); Marianna v. Ark. Mun. League, 722 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Ark. 1987) (“Terms
and conditions” of program under which organization would defend certain lawsuits, included that the program
“shall, in the sole discretion of the Program administrators, provide extraordinary legal defense” in certain
lawsuits); Commonwealth v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., No. 334 M.D. 2014, 2019 Pa. Commw. Unpub.
LEXIS 305, at *16 (Pa. Commw. Ct. April 3, 2019) (“Terms and conditions” of program offered by health plan
included power, in plan’s “sole discretion” to modify or terminate program); Parker v. Ind. State Fair Bd., 992
N.E.2d 969, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“General Terms and Conditions” for state fair participation adopted by
state fair board in exercise of delegated legislative authority “give the [Board] broad discretion to interpret its
rules, administer a drug testing program and assess appropriate penalties.”); People v. Thomas, 577 N.E.2d 496,
497 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding it improper for court to delegate discretion to require treatment program as a
condition of probation because “[t]he determination of the terms and conditions of probation is a judicial
function”) (citations omitted).
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conditions” is used to refer to the rules of a program.374 Here again, “terms” can
include rules that confer on the party running the program the discretion to benefit
the other or not.375
In connection with a program in which people choose to participate, “conditions”
can be used to refer to the requirements the beneficiary must meet in order to
participate in the program.376 “Conditions” in this sense can be used to refer to
requirements that the program administrator can waive.377 As applied to FFELP
loans, the borrower’s promise to repay is itself a “condition” of the borrower’s
participation. This promise to repay is qualified by the possibility that the Secretary
will use relinquishment authority to forgive. For DLP loans to have the “same”
conditions, as provided by U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(1), they arguably would have to have
the same qualifications on the obligation to repay, including the qualification created
by the Secretary’s relinquishment authority.
Loan forgiveness via relinquishment authority could also be a “benefit” of the
FFEL Program even if “benefit” is understood to mean something narrower than
“advantage,” the interpretation discussed previously.378 One of the less expansive
ordinary meanings of “benefit” is financial aid received under a government
program.379 Loan forgiveness is arguably a “benefit” in this sense. And a benefit
under a program need not be available as a matter of right to be a benefit. In the
famous Bakke case, Justice Powell’s opinion refers to the “opportunity to participate”
in an educational program as a “benefit.”380 Thus, the opportunity to receive

374. See, e.g., Beltran v. Smith, 458 U.S. 1303, 1305 (1982) (rejecting Witness Protection Program
participant’s application for stay of ruling denying relief: “There is no indication that the officials responsible
for the program will not continue to provide him with protection under the terms of the program.”); Sleater v.
Benton Cty., 812 F. App’x 470, 471 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Under the terms of the [Legal Financial Obligations]
program, if an LFO debtor failed to make a monthly payment . . . the Clerk’s office would issue an arrest
warrant.”).
375. See Apple, Inc. v. Corellium, LLC, No. 19-81160-CIV-SMITH, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36577, at *17
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2021) (“[T]erms” of Apple’s Security Bounty Program Policy included provisions that
“[p]ayments are at Apple’s sole discretion” and “[r]ewards are granted solely at the exclusive discretion of
Apple.”).
376. See, e.g., United States v. Knotterus, 139 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1998) (using “conditions” of IRS
program interchangeably with “eligibility requirements” of the program). The phrase “conditions of eligibility”
is commonly used to describe the prerequisites for participation in a government program. See, e.g., Bowen v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 883 (1988); Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 80, 95 (1st Cir. 2014); Anderson v.
Recore, 446 F.3d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 2006).
377. See United States v. Jones, No. 17-20697, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190768, at *12–*13 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 15, 2020) (stating that a “condition” of defendant’s supervised release was that he participate in a substance
abuse treatment program, but that “[t]his condition may be waived at the discretion of the Probation
Department”).
378. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
379. See Benefit, AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 273 (“A payment made or an entitlement available in
accordance with . . . a public assistance program.”); Benefit, AMERICAN HERITAGE CONCISE, supra note 273
(retaining the same definition as AMERICAN HERITAGE); Benefit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE, supra
note 273 (“[F]inancial help in time of sickness, old age, or unemployment.”).
380. Regents Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265, 304 (1978) (quoting Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568
(1974)); see also United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that program aimed
at “giving exclusive opportunities” to certain businesses was a “Government Benefit Program” for application
of federal sentencing guidelines). Standing cases also support the point. See, e.g., Ne. Fla. Chapter of Assoc.
Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (plaintiffs had standing based on allegation
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forgiveness under relinquishment authority could be a “benefit” of the FFEL
Program.
2. Counterarguments
Apart from the fact that the HEA does not directly call relinquishment authority
part of the “terms and conditions,” or a “term,” or a “condition” of the FFEL Program,
there are at least two counterarguments to the positions just presented. The first
builds on the observation that program “conditions” can include eligibility
requirements. It is also possible that the “conditions” mentioned in U.S.C. §§
1087a(b)(1) and 1087e(a)(1) are limited to FFELP eligibility requirements.381 Older
versions of some provisions of Title IV do seem to use “conditions” to refer to
eligibility requirements for forgiveness and repayment assistance programs,382 but
“conditions” does not appear to be consistently used to mean “eligibility
requirements.”383 There does not seem to be any particularly compelling reason to
limit “conditions” to loan eligibility requirements, but that interpretation is plausible.
If adopted, it would cut against the legal argument for jubilee, as it would foreclose
the possibility that “conditions” refers to relinquishment authority or the possibility
of its exercise.
The more significant objection is that it is not clear that the “terms, conditions,
and benefits” of FFEL loans necessarily include all terms, conditions, and benefits
of the FFEL program. Little authority bears significantly on this question. Given
that the program’s rules govern the loans, it stands to reason that their status as
“terms, conditions, and benefits” should also carry over.
G. Additional Textual Arguments on Relinquishment Applicability to Direct Loans
This section addresses two additional textual arguments relating to whether
relinquishment authority extends to direct loans. These arguments are not based on
the use of individual words and phrases in the statute but relate to higher-level aspects
of the statutory design. The first is that the meager nature of the powers that Part D
explicitly grants the Secretary, combined with the fuller suite of authorities in Part B,
suggests that the parity provision ought to carry over the Part B powers. The second
is simply that not all “terms, conditions, and benefits” of FFELP loans can apply to

of imposition of barrier to receipt of government benefit; they did not have to show they were ultimately unable
to get the benefit).
381. FFELP loans had several prerequisites for eligibility. For example, all recipients of federal student aid
first must be enrolled or accepted at a program leading to a recognized educational credential at an eligible
institution of higher education. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(1). Additionally, these recipients must either (a) be a
citizen, national, or permanent resident, or (b) provide evidence from the INS of intent to become a citizen or
permanent resident, § 1091(a)(5).
382. See id. § 1078-10(e)(2); id. § 1078-11(f)(2).
383. For example, the HEA provides that certain outstanding loans remain subject to the “same terms and
conditions” if they are sold under a particular provision. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078-6(a)(4). If “conditions” were
limited strictly to conditions of eligibility, it seems it would not be necessary to specify that loans that have
already been made retain the same conditions when sold.
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direct loans because the programs have different structures and different players.
This problem is resolved by applying the parity provision to Part D only where it can
be applied, that is, to aspects of the DLP that are analogous to the FFELP. The
possibility of forgiveness for federally held loans is just such an analogous attribute.
1. Statutory Structure
Statutory structure supports the idea that relinquishment authority extends to
direct loans, as both the CLM Letter and Herrine observe. 384 The statutory
framework for the Ford program in Part D is rather skeletal. As the CLM Letter
points out, Part D does not even expressly authorize the Secretary to sue and be sued
in connection with the Direct Loan Program, unlike Part B, which does contain such
authorization in connection with the FFELP.385
Part D’s provisions are sparse with respect to collection procedures other than
filing suit as well.386 Part B of Title IV sets a substantive standard of due diligence
for loan collection,387 provides that that standard entails the use of collection
procedures “at least as extensive and forceful” as those financial institutions use to
collect consumer debt,388 and authorizes the Secretary to specify due diligence
activities by regulation.389 In contrast, Part D addresses servicing and collection by
emphasizing that the Secretary “shall, to the extent practicable,” contract these
functions out.390 It provides no substantive standard for collection and does not even
clearly authorize the Secretary to prescribe regulations for collections activity.391
It has been suggested that one should draw a negative inference from the fact that
the HEA explicitly grants relinquishment authority for the FFEL and Perkins
programs and not for the DLP.392 The parity provisions, combined with the sparse
authorities explicitly granted to the Secretary in Part D, go a long way toward
rebutting any such inference: Congress left a lot out of Part D, the argument goes,
because it relied on the parity provisions to fill the gaps. As we have seen, the

384. See Herrine, supra note 1, at 371 n.265; CLM Letter, supra note 3, n.5.
385. See CLM Letter, supra note 3.
386. See Hunt I, supra note 36, at 1181.
387. See 20 U.S.C. § 1078(c)(2)(A) (requiring FFELP agreements between guaranty agency and Secretary
to set forth procedures “to assure that due diligence will be exercised in the collection of loans insured under
the program”); id. § 1080(d) (requiring “reasonable care and diligence in the making and collection of loans
under the provisions of this part.”) (internal citations omitted).
388. Id. § 1085(f).
389. See id. § 1072b(d)(3)(A)–(B).
390. Id. § 1087f(a)(1).
391. One provision does require institutions and servicers under the Ford program to comply with the
FFELP disclosure provisions of 20 U.S.C. § 1083 “in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary shall
prescribe.” Id. § 1087e(p). However, the quoted phrase may refer to the Secretary’s authorization to regulate
FFELP servicing under Part B. See id. § 1082(a)(1) (authorizing Secretary to “prescribe such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of” Part B). Part D also authorizes the Secretary to require borrowers
to pay reasonable collection costs. See id. § 1087e(d)(5)(A).
392. See Mark Kantrowitz, Is Student Debt Forgiveness by Executive Order Illegal?, COLL. INV. (Mar. 11,
2021), https://thecollegeinvestor.com/35892/is-student-loan-forgiveness-by-executive-order-legal/ (noting
grants of compromise authority for FFEL and Perkins loans and observing “[t]here is no similar language for
Part D for the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) program.”).
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Department has relied extensively on the parity provision to make the student loan
programs work.393 The Court has been reluctant to embrace interpretations that
would upend major statutory schemes,394 as a holding that the Secretary’s Part B
powers do not extend to Part D would do.
Relatedly, it simply does not make sense that the Secretary would lack the same
power over DLP loans as over FFELP loans.395 Why should the Secretary be able to
compromise, waive, release, and modify FFELP loans made by private parties and
not DLP loans made by the federal government itself? Certainly, no opponent of
jubilee has made the case that different treatment is justified. This point might
deserve even more emphasis if the federal courts’ primary approach to statutory
interpretation were purposivist rather than textualist; but even textualists recognize
the importance of honoring statutory purpose where it is discernible from the text396
and avoiding absurdity.397
2. Scope of “Same Terms, Conditions, and Benefits”
Application of every FFELP loan term to all DLP loans of the corresponding
type398 is impossible. For one thing, lenders are expressly authorized to offer varying
terms under the FFEL program, so there is no single set of “terms, conditions, and
benefits” of each type of FFELP loan to carry over to the corresponding type of DLP
loan. 399 Moreover, many aspects of the FFEL program are unique to the FFEL
program, as they are particular to its lender-guaranty agency-federal reinsurance
structure.400 For example, the per-student dollar limit on federal insurability of loans
under the FFELP cannot be applied to the DLP through the “same terms, conditions,
and benefits” provision because there is no federal insurance of federal direct
loans.401
Yet textualism demands that we give the parity provisions some meaning, if
possible, rather than abandoning them because one interpretation makes them
nonsensical.402 The most sensible way of resolving the problem seems to be to
interpret the “same terms, conditions, and benefits” provision to cover the terms,

393. See discussion supra Part III.A.
394. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 498 (2015) (interpreting the Affordable Care Act using
“context and structure” to “avoid the type of calamitous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid.”).
395. See Hunt I, supra note 36, at 1181 (arguing that sensible interpretation is that relinquishment authority
extends to DLP).
396. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 56–58.
397. See id. at 234–39.
398. Recall that the U.S.C. § 1087e(a) sets up four categories of DLP loans, each corresponding to a category
of FFELP loans. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(a)(2) (2021).
399. See, e.g., id. § 1083(a)(12) (requiring disclosure before loan proceeds disbursement of “the minimum
and maximum repayment terms which the lender may impose”); id. § 1083(b)(8) (requiring disclosure before
repayment of “an explanation of any special options the borrower may have for loan consolidation”); id. §§
1094(h)(1)(A)(ii), (h)(1)(C) (requiring records of certain individual lenders’ “terms and conditions favorable to
the borrower” and “additional benefits beyond the standard terms and conditions or provisions for such loans”).
400. See Hunt II, supra note 334, at 98 (describing FFELP’s structure).
401. See 20 U.S.C. § 1075(a)(1)(A).
402. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 63–65.
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conditions, and benefits that are uniform across the FFEL program and are capable
of application to the DLP. In other words, one could say that the provision operates
where it can operate. That is not incompatible with the text.403
Under this interpretation, the parity provisions would not call for the application
of federal-insurance-specific provisions of the FFELP to the DLP because there is no
federal insurance under the DLP for them to apply to. But there is no comparable
difficulty in applying relinquishment authority to the DLP: the FFELP provision
authorizes the government to release FFELP claims it holds, and there is no inherent
problem with the government releasing DLP claims it holds.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has embraced a brand of textualism that deemphasizes
widespread lay understanding of legal materials. This development has advantages
and disadvantages for proponents of federal student loan jubilee. On the one hand,
courts may be more willing to disregard the traditional view that the Secretary lacks
the power to order jubilee in favor of a contrary conclusion based on the statute’s
clear text. On the other hand, they also may be more willing to disregard the
traditional view that the Secretary’s powers are equivalent across loan programs and
demand a textual explanation of why jubilee authority covers direct loans and not just
FFELP loans. This demand pushes to the forefront the previously obscure question
of whether the Secretary’s power to compromise, waive, release, and modify claims
is part of the “terms, conditions, and benefits” of FFELP loans.
This Article has analyzed that question from a textualist perspective and
suggested two conclusions: (1) the opportunity to gain loan forgiveness is probably
a “benefit” of FFELP loans, and (2) the authority to forgive is probably part of the
“terms and conditions” of FFELP loans. In offering these results, this Article
contends that a major legal obstacle to student loan jubilee can be overcome.

403. See 2 A NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:7 (7th
ed. 2020) (“[W]ords or clauses may be enlarged or restricted to harmonize with other provisions of an act.”).

